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I. INTRODUCTION
Law and economics is a top-heavy discipline, in the sense that it is
largely theoretical. Empirical tests of its claims have been carried out
only recently, and a great deal remains to be done. The larger part of
the recent wave of empirical law and economics research, however, ex-
amines the litigation process. This research has focused on the frequen-
cies with which lawsuits are brought and with which they are settled.1
Surprisingly, empirical researchers2 have given little attention to the
theoretical literature that makes predictions concerning incentives to
comply with legal rules and the optimality of compliance equilibria.3
This lack of attention is disappointing because compliance theory has a
greater claim to being "core," or central, to the law and economics liter-
ature than does litigation theory.
The reason for the uneven fit between empirical and theoretical re-
search agendas is clear: it is difficult to observe the effects of legal stan-
1. For recent contributions, see Patricia Munch Danzon and Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out
of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983); Edward A.
Snyder and James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts
Theory, 6 J. L. Econ. & Org. 345 (1990); Gary M. Fournier and Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation
and Settlement: An Empirical Approach, 71 Rev. Econ. & Stats. 189 (1989); Theodore Eisenberg,
Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal
Stud. 337 (1990).
2. See, for example, Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 555,
587-89 (1985) (discussing empirical studies of the deterrent effect of tort law). Workers' compensa-
tion has received more attention from empirical researchers than most other areas of tort law. For
an example of the growing body of rigorous and detailed empirical investigations of the effects of
workers' compensation, see generally Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Compensation Mecha-
nisms for Job Risks: Wages, Workers' Compensation, and Product Liability 3 (Princeton U.,
1990).
3. A significant part of the work at the foundation concerns tort rules. See, for example,
Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 3 (Yale U., 1970); Wil-
liam M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 1 (Harvard U.,
1987); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 1 (Harvard U., 1987). See also John
Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973); Peter Dia-
mond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. Legal Stud. 107 (1974); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. Legal
Stud. 151 (1988); Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 433 (1990).
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dards on ordinary behavior outside of the courtroom. How, for example,
should one go about determining the effect of the negligence rule on the
caretaking behavior of drivers? Nature provides few experiments and
the cost of creating the required experiments is prohibitive. In the area
of fee shifting, for example, courts and commentators have long justi-
fied deviations from the American fee shifting rule by referring to ef-
fects on compliance incentives.4 Not a shred of empirical evidence on
the compliance effects of alternative fee shifting rules exists, however,
and it is unlikely that it ever will, given the cost of the required
experiments.
This Article aims to construct a partial bridge between predictive
and empirical research on compliance with legal rules. The Article ex-
amines the effects of alternative fee shifting rules on incentives to com-
ply with the law, to litigate, and to settle disputes, by simulating a
model of litigation that incorporates compliance effects.5
This Article examines four fee shifting rules: the American rule,
which requires each party to pay his own litigation costs; the British
rule, which requires the losing party to pay the winning party's costs in
addition to his own; the "Proplaintiff" rule, which requires the plaintiff
to pay only his own costs if he loses and no costs otherwise; and the
"Prodefendant" rule, which requires the defendant to pay only his own
costs if he loses and no costs otherwise. The Article also examines the
compliance effects of fee shifting under alternative "information re-
gimes." The first information regime assumes that the defendant knows
whether he violated the legal standard, but the plaintiff does not know.
In the second, the plaintiff knows whether the defendant violated the
legal standard, but the defendant does not know. In the third, neither
party knows with certainty whether the defendant violated the legal
standard.
The Article concludes that fee shifting in favor of prevailing plain-
tiffs generates the greatest incentive to comply with the law, and this
4. See, for example, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 98
(1899) (stating that the purpose of a fee shifting statute is to "secure the utmost care on the part
of railroad companies to prevent the escape of fire from their moving trains"). See also Hindman v.
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 32 Idaho 133, 178 P. 837 (1918); Daly v. Look, 267 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1954).
5. This Article expands on an earlier one. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation
Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard, 22 J. Legal Stud. 455 (1993). The earlier
article presents a new economic model of litigation, discusses its implications for the economic
theory of litigation, and briefly describes the results of a simulation of the model. This Article
expands on the previous one by presenting the results of simulating several versions of the litiga-
tion model and by discussing in more detail the implications for fee shifting law. Several versions
of the model are explored in this Article so that the normative implications could be considered
somewhat robust. In short, while the first article focused on litigation theory, this Article empha-
sizes and expands on the normative implications.
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result holds in each information regime examined. The reason is simple:
litigation costs are a significant obstacle to victims who wish to bring
suit. The Proplaintiff rule nearly eliminates this obstacle. The Article
also reveals that fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs generates
the least litigation.6 The reason is that the greater incentive to sue gen-
erates greater compliance incentives. Thus, under the Proplaintiff rule,
the pool of defendants contains the smallest proportion of guilty de-
fendants relative to the other fee shifting rules. Since plaintiffs will
then rationally estimate that the probability that a defendant is inno-
cent is reasonably high, they are more likely to settle under the
Proplaintiff rule.
The Article finally considers the implications of these results for
Supreme Court decisions on fee shifting. The results suggest that the
best fee shifting rule is one that shifts fees in favor of prevailing plain-
tiffs and against plaintiffs only in cases of bad faith litigation,7 which is
the standard the Supreme Court adopted in interpreting the two-way
fee shifting provision of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976. In addition, the majority and dissenting opinions in Evans v. Jeff
6. More precisely, the probability of litigation, given an accident, is lowest under the
Proplaintiff rule. It follows that these results understate the extent to which the Proplaintiff rule
reduces litigation. Because the Proplaintiff rule generates the highest level of compliance, it leads
to the lowest accident frequency. Thus, the base of accidents from which disputes arise is lowest
under the Proplaintiff rule. The frequency of litigation is the probability of an accident multiplied
by the probability of litigation, given an accident. The Proplaintiff rule minimizes both terms.
7. This rule would be "best" in the sense that it leads to the highest level of compliance and
the least litigation. One might say that this is economically efficient, but this Article does not make
that claim.
This Article is not the first to argue that fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs is desira-
ble on incentive grounds. Incentive arguments have been made in recent articles defending pro-
plaintiff fee shifting in civil rights litigation. See, for example, Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front
in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 Tex. L. Rev.
291 (1990); James Kraus, Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the Waiver of Attorney's
Fees by Civil Rights Litigants in Exchange for Favorable Settlement of Cases Under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 597 (1984). While this Article does not
aim to detract from either of these articles, especially the riveting argument presented by Kraus,
neither piece focuses on general incentive issues, and neither argues for a general rule shifting fees
in favor of prevailing plaintiffs. For the most impressive statement of the argument that a general
rule shifting fees in favor of prevailing plaintiffs is desirable on incentive grounds, see John Leub-
sdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 Rutgers L. Rev. 439 (1986).
In addition to incentive-based arguments, a large literature evaluates fee shifting on "justice"
grounds. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
Cal. L. Rev. 792 (1966); First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 Mass. L. Q. 1,
64 (1925); Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L. J. 849 (1929); Charles T. McCormick, Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1931);
Richard Cosway, Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. Cin. L. Rev. 313 (1941);
Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 Yale L. J. 699 (1940); William B.
Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202 (1966);
Warren Watson, A Rationale of the Law of Costs, 16 Cent. L. J. 306 (1883). This Article does not
discuss the justice arguments.
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D. and Marek v. Chesny assume that a tension exists between settle-
ment and compliance incentives. This assumption may simply be inva-
lid; no tension or necessary tradeoff may exist between the settlement-
and compliance-enhancing properties of fee shifting rules.
II. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF FEE SHIFTING
As in economics literature generally, both positive and normative
economic analyses of fee shifting exist. The positive analyses typically
aim to predict the effect of fee shifting rules on incentives to bring suit
or to settle disputes. The normative work aims to prescribe an optimal
fee shifting rule. Normative analysis is more general in the sense that
nothing constrains the normative analyst to examine existing fee rules.
A. Normative Analyses of Fee Shifting: The Public Subsidization
Argument
Sheldon Amos likely presented the first normative analysis of fee
shifting." Amos argued that litigation costs should be borne entirely by
the state because litigation results from uncertainty in the law,' and
legal uncertainty in turn exists because the state has been insufficiently
clear in framing legal rules, either in the form of court decisions or
statutes.10
The problem of designing an optimal fee shifting rule did not ap-
pear in legal literature again until Kenneth Dayton's discussion in the
Annals of the American Academy in 1933.11 Dayton refined Amos's ar-
gument by proposing that legal fees be borne by the state only with
respect to legal issues that affect the public. With respect to factual
issues, or legal issues that affect only the parties to the dispute, the
parties should bear the litigation costs for two reasons. First, the uncer-
8. Sheldon Amos, The Science of Law (D. Appleton & Co., 1875). Amos's book was the first
attempt to provide some theoretical examination of the law of costs. If one takes a very broad view
of the term "normative theory," one could argue that Blackstone provided a normative analysis
when he referred to statutes that "very equitably gave the defendant, if he prevailed, the same
costs as the plaintiff would have had, in case he had recovered." William Blackstone, 3 Commenta-
ries on the Laws of England *399. This Article does not take such a broad view of the term
"normative theory."
9. Amos, The Science of Law at 316-17. Amos's proposal, when viewed as a fee shifting rule,
suggests that all fees should be shifted to the state.
10. Of course, a large amount of literature exists on the certainty of legal rules. For recent
contributions, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & Econ. 249 (1976); Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Cal. L.
Rev. 1 (1983). The notion that certain fee shifting rules contribute more to legal certainty than
others is explored in J. Robert S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect
of Cost, Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. Legal Stud.
451 (1988). See also D'Amato, 71 Cal. L. Rev. at 30 n.62.
11. Kenneth Dayton, Costs, Fees, and Expenses in Litigation, 167 Annals 32 (1933).
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tainty in these areas is not the result of the state's sloppiness in framing
legal rules. The second and more interesting reason Dayton offered is
that resolution of legal issues generally benefits many parties, while res-
olution of factual issues generally benefits only the parties to the dis-
pute. For this reason litigation of legal issues provides a public good; it
is costly to provide, but once provided its benefits spill over to many
individuals. Without state subsidization, legal issues would be litigated
at less than the optimal rate.12
The crucial weakness in the Amos-Dayton public subsidization ar-
gument is the assumption that legal uncertainty is entirely attributable
to the state. Two types of legal uncertainty exist. One type is uncer-
tainty in the framing of legal rules, which results because the applicable
legal rule was either never stated by a court or legislature, or stated at
too general a level to indicate clearly the scope of its application.1" The
second type of uncertainty concerns the stability of a legal rule.1 4 Even
if it is clear to the parties that the rule applies to them, they still may
be unsure that the rule will stand for a period of time sufficient to allow
12. The theory of public goods posits that such goods are generally undersupplied by the
market. See Jack Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 478-82 (Prentice-Hall, 4th ed. 1988).
Pro-plaintiff fee shifting provides an alternative to public subsidization that might address some of
the problems identified by the public goods theory. Because plaintiffs generally will have insuffi-
cient incentives to bring suit when the claim will establish a right that benefits many, pro-plaintiff
fee shifting will correct the incentive problem to some extent by encouraging plaintiffs to sue. The
problem with this proposition is that the full litigation costs are still borne by the parties; there-
fore, they will have an incentive to settle the dispute. Disputes that are settled do not produce the
public benefits Dayton's proposal seeks. Thus, if the public good aspects of litigation are substan-
tial, the state should subsidize some portion of expenses in order to enhance incentives to bring
suit and reduce incentives to settle. For a more recent version of the public goods argument
against settlement, see Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L. J. 1073 (1984).
13. Framing uncertainty has been of greatest concern in the literature on legal uncertainty.
See, for example, D'Amato, 71 Cal. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 10). It seems fair to say that the
entire field of statutory construction is concerned with this type of uncertainty. The classic exam-
ple of uncertainty in framing is a statute described originally by Puffendorf and later by Black-
stone that forbad a layman to "lay hands" on a priest. See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries
on the Laws of England *59. Courts held that the statute applied to an individual who hurt a
priest with a weapon, even though a literal construction would not have supported this result.
Blackstone defended this interpretation as consistent with the then-popular use of the term "lay
hands," which he understood to mean "to harm." Id. Bentham criticized Blackstone's interpreta-
tion and offered an alternative. He proposed that the purpose of the statute was to prevent local
justice authorities from apprehending priests; otherwise, it would have made little sense to restrict
its application to laymen. Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries: A Criticism of
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England *15-18. Thus, a rule forbidding a
layman to lay hands on a priest is a source of framing uncertainty because it generates at least
three plausible interpretations: (1) a layman cannot touch a priest; (2) a layman cannot hurt a
priest; and (3) a layman cannot arrest a priest.
14. See Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law 77-96 (D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961) (emphasizing
the distinction between certainty in framing and certainty in stability).
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them to plan their affairs with the understanding that the rule will re-
main in effect.
The first type of uncertainty-ambiguity in framing-seems to be
attributable to the state. It is not at all clear, however, that litigation in
this area produces a public good. Dayton noted that issues can be di-
vided into factual and legal categories. Factual issues generally do not
exhibit public good characteristics; therefore, the cost of factual-issue
litigation should be borne entirely by the parties to the dispute. Dayton
failed to note, however, that legal issues can be subdivided further into
two categories. With respect to one set of legal issues, the applicable
rule is predictable because the parties have developed a set of norms
that operate as law, or because the rules that should govern are clear or
obvious to the parties even though no court has ever provided a stamp
of approval.15 In the other set of legal issues, the rules that should gov-
ern are unpredictable, either because customs or norms have not devel-
oped and the appropriate norms are unclear, or because the norms that
have developed are unsustainable in the absence of an explicit agree-
ment.1" Litigation provides a public good only in the latter subcategory;
therefore, it is only within this subcategory that public subsidization of
litigation can be justified by the public good theory. The question that
remains for the Amos-Dayton argument is how large the second subcat-
15. This point refers to implicit agreements, such as coordination rules, that sometimes gov-
ern social interaction. An example of a coordination rule is "drive on the right side of the street."
When such rules have developed without the help of the state, litigation that simply reproduces
the accepted norm provides no public good. Litigation that overturns the accepted norm provides a
public good only if the new rule Pareto dominates the original rule. Rule A Pareto dominates Rule
B if a switch from B to A improves the welfare of at least one person and leaves everyone else in at
least the same position. See, for example, Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications at 462 (cited
in note 12).
A self-enforcing norm may develop without the help of the state if no party has an incentive
to deviate from the norm once it is established. For a game-theoretic explanation of cooperative
norms, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic, 1984). The theory of cooperative
norms goes back to Hume and was expanded by Hayek. See F. A. Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation, and
Liberty: Rules and Order (U. of Chicago, 1973).
Blackstone provided the most extreme version of this view of law (incidentally, he was the
first to offer a theory of legal uncertainty). Blackstone argued that common law was drawn from
the set of implicit agreements governing social interaction. See Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *63-92
(cited in note 13). It follows from this proposition that as long as those agreements are accepted
and understood, litigation cannot provide a public good. Common law generally was clear under
Blackstone's theory because it existed independently of the state's efforts to articulate or codify it.
Blackstone's theory is resuscitated in Leoni's book. See Leoni, Freedom and the Law at 77-96
(cited in note 14).
16. Nuisance law provides a rich source of examples of regime changes that require the es-
tablishment of new norms. Nuisance law has long recognized that a reasonable activity can become
unreasonable as the result of change in the surrounding community. When such a change occurs,
the appropriate norms are no longer clear. See, for example, Ensign v. Walls, 323 Mich. 49, 34
N.W.2d 549 (1948) (holding that a dog breeder's business became a nuisance within the commu-
nity that developed around it).
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egory is, for if it contains only a minor set of issues, then the public
good theory generates the conclusion that no (or virtually no) litigation
costs should be borne by the state. If disputes that are governed by
unpredictable legal rules arise infrequently, then the administrative
costs of identifying this set of disputes and applying a state reimburse-
ment policy could easily outweigh the potential benefits.
Now consider uncertainty with respect to the stability of a legal
rule. Here the Amos-Dayton argument rests on an even weaker founda-
tion because stability-based uncertainty is not attributable entirely to
the state; it often results from efforts of private parties to overturn legal
rules.17 Once this fact is taken into account, an important cost ignored
by the Amos-Dayton analysis reveals itself. If one of the parties is able
to persuade the court to adopt its preferred statement of a legal rule,
then the door is opened under state subsidization to litigants whose sole
aim is to rewrite the law in a fashion that suits them.I s Public subsidi-
zation of such efforts would generate an endless supply of litigants,
likely an undesirable result.19
The argument for public subsidization relies on the unproven and
perhaps unprovable central assumption of legal positivism: that uncer-
tainty in the law is attributable entirely to the state. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to resolve this issue. It should be sufficient to note,
however, that because it is unresolved, the Amos-Dayton argument for
public subsidization is incomplete. Setting aside the public subsidiza-
17. It may be helpful to distinguish types of stability or intertemporal uncertainty in legal
rules. One type concerns statutes; the other concerns common-law rules. In neither case is stability
uncertainty entirely attributable to the state. The state is certainly responsible for setting up insti-
tutions that permit stability-based uncertainty to result. Nevertheless, private efforts to encourage
legislation or to litigate in order to change the law are important sources of stability uncertainty.
In addition, the ease with which a legal rule can be changed encourages efforts to change the rule.
Thus, if judges show no reluctance to reverse established rules, private parties will be all the more
willing to litigate in order to reverse a given rule. It follows that stare decisis enhances legal cer-
tainty not only by reducing the likelihood that the court will overturn a legal rule in a given case,
but also by reducing the number of challenges to legal rules.
18. See Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 205 (1982). Rubin
argues that common-law rules will not necessarily tend toward wealth maximization because some
litigants will approach the litigation process in the same manner in which they would approach the
legislative process; they will litigate with the intention of establishing legal rules that have the
effect of transferring wealth from other parties to themselves. Id. at 222. Rubin attributes his
thesis to Gordon Tullock. See Gordon Tullock, Evolutionary Theory in Law and Economics, in
Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. and Paul H. Rubin, eds., 4 Research in Law and Economics 74, 79-80 (JAI,
1982).
19. It is not clear that this result would be desirable for the reasons given by Tullock and
Rubin. See note 18. If the litigation process is largely an attempt to generate rules that transfer
wealth, the net effect of litigation is to reduce society's wealth. The end result is a transfer from A
to B (which leaves society's wealth the same) after incurring litigation costs, which ultimately
reduces society's wealth.
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tion issue, the remainder of this Article will examine fee shifting under
the assumption that the parties bear the litigation costs.
B. Positive Economic Analyses of Fee Shifting
This subpart examines the positive economic analyses of fee shift-
ing. Although more recent, the volume of literature based on positive
theory now exceeds that based on the normative theory.20
1. The Mause-Shavell Analysis
Statements concerning the incentive effects of fee shifting can be
found in some of the earliest literature on the subject,2' but scholars did
not attempt an economic analysis of the incentive effects until Philip J.
Mause's contribution.22 Mause compared British and American fee
rules to demonstrate that the claim that fee shifting would reduce court
congestion is invalid as a general proposition. Mause concluded that the
effect a shift to the British rule would have on the total amount of liti-
gation is ambiguous; although pessimistic plaintiffs would be discour-
aged from litigating under the British rule, optimistic plaintiffs would
be encouraged. 23 Mause also concluded that fee shifting would be desir-
able in cases involving small but legitimate claims.24
Relying on the litigation model developed by Landes, Gould,
and Posner, 25 Steven Shavell carried out the next positive analy-
20. Because of the size of the literature, this Article discusses only the portions that serve
best as a background for Part II, which presents a new model of litigation. Some recent important
contributions to the theory of fee shifting that are not discussed in this Part are Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 Rand J. Econ. 404 (1984);
Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 143 (1987); Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and
the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 Rand J. Econ. 557 (1986); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settle-
ment, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. Legal Stud. 157 (1989).
21. The incentive arguments in the early discussions generally consisted of little more than
an assertion that cost shifting would have the desired effect-that is, shifting costs would reduce
court congestion or give the poor plaintiff a greater incentive to sue. For early discussions of the
incentive effects of fee shifting, see Dayton, 167 Annals at 32 (cited in note 11); First Report, 11
Mass. L. Q. at 63 (cited in note 7); Goodhart, 38 Yale L. J. at 849 (cited in note 7); Howard
Greenberger, The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 Vill. L. Rev. 400
(1964); Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75
(1963); Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 78
(1953).
22. Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55
Iowa L. Rev. 26 (1969).
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id. at 33-34.
25. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & Econ. 61 (1971);
John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973); Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399
(1973).
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sis.2 Following Mause, Shavell asked whether victims are more likely to
bring suit under the American or the British rule, and whether, given
suit, settlement is more likely under the American or the British rule.
Shavell expanded upon Mause's analysis by using a mathematical
model and by examining, in addition to the American and British rules,
one-way shifting in favor of the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant.
Let Pp be the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a verdict in
his favor, and Pd be the defendant's estimate of the probability of a
verdict in the plaintiff's favor. Let CP be the plaintiff's cost of litigating
and Cd be the defendant's cost of litigating. Let J be the judgment. A
plaintiff will bring suit under the American rule when
PpJ > Cp,
and under the British rule when
PpJ > (a - Pp)(Cp + Cd).
Comparing the two requirements, suit is more likely under the British
rule if
Pp > Cd/(Cp + Cd).
Thus, the more optimistic the plaintiff, other things being equal, the
more likely it is that the plaintiff will bring suit under the British rule.
In considering incentives to settle, Shavell assumed that settlement
occurs only if the plaintiff's minimum settlement demand is less than
the defendant's maximum settlement offer.17 Under the American rule
the plaintiff's minimum demand is PpJ - Cp; the defendant's maximum
offer is PdJ + Cd. The difference between the maximum offer and the
minimum demand is known as the settlement or contract zone. 8 Given
suit, settlement occurs under the American rule if
(Pp - Pd)J < (Cp + Cd).
That is, settlement occurs if the perceived difference in the stakes is
less than the total cost of litigation.2
26. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alterna-
tive Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982).
27. Id. at 56-57.
28. See Linda R. Stanley and Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypoth-
esis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. Legal Stud. 145, 147 (1990).
29. Shavell, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 63 (cited in note 26). If the parties have different expecta-
tions of J (given a verdict for the plaintiff), they would settle only if PpJp - PdJd < Cp + Cd. Why
might parties have different expectations of J, conditional on a verdict for the plaintiff? One possi-
bility is that plaintiffs are "one shot" litigants and defendants are "repeat players." The repeat
players may have a high conditional expectation of J because they anticipate future litigation. For
a theory of litigation that relies largely on this notion, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974).
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Under the British rule, the plaintiff's minimum settlement demand
is P J - (1 - Pp)(Cp + Cd); the defendant's maximum settlement offer
is PdJ + Pd(Cp + Cd). Given suit, settlement occurs under the British
rule if
(P - Pd)J < (1 - Pp + Pd)(Cp + C+).
These conditions imply that settlement is generally more likely
under the American rule. This is true because if the plaintiff is more
optimistic than the defendant (a necessary though not sufficient condi-
tion for litigation), the British rule has the effect of reducing the sum of
the expected legal costs. Alternatively, the British rule raises the stakes,
which makes litigation more attractive to the parties when the plaintiff
places a higher estimate on the likelihood of his winning than does the
defendant.30
In an extension of the Mause-Shavell framework, John Donohue
has recently argued that the Coase theorem implies that settlement fre-
quencies should be the same under the British and American rules.31
The reason is that if the plaintiff is relatively optimistic, both parties,
under certain conditions, will be made better off ex ante by agreeing to
comply with the British rule. 2 Given that the parties will have an in-
centive to adopt the cost allocation rule that maximizes joint wealth,
one should observe the same settlement rates under the American and
British rules. The rules simply are default provisions around which the
parties are free to bargain.
By assuming that parties have the same conditional expectation of J, given a verdict for the
plaintiff, the theory outlined in the text rules out the possibility that litigation is driven by differ-
ences in the conditional expectations of J. Several reasons for this approach exist. The first is
simplicity. The second and most important is that the litigation model examined in this Article
focuses on differences in estimates of the likelihood of plaintiff victory. Taking into consideration
differences in the conditional expectation of J would divert attention from the central concern.
Third, the case for relying on differences in the conditional expectation of J in any effort to explain
litigation is far from settled empirically. See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. Legal Stud. 187 (1993).
30. Shavell, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 59 (cited in note 26). Mause also made this point. See
Mause, 55 Iowa L. Rev. at 31 (cited in note 22). The conclusion is inconsistent with the Coase
theorem, which would suggest that settlement rates would be the same under either cost allocation
rule. John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can't Remember
the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093, 1099-109 (1991). For further discussion of
the Coase theorem and settlement, see notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
31. Donohue, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1099.
32. If Pp > Cd/(CP + Cd) > Pd, under the British rule the plaintiff will attach a greater
expected value to the right to bring suit, and the defendant will bear less expected liability. Thus,
both parties will be better off ex ante by agreeing to comply with the British rule. Given the
conditions, an agreement to comply with the British rule will be Pareto optimal. Donohue envi-
sions a lawsuit with the American rule operating in the background, in which the parties agree
during settlement negotiations to comply with the British rule if they fail to settle the case. Id.
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The Coase theorem identifies some important theoretical issues in
the examination of settlement incentives. Because it is unlikely to ex-
plain settlement patterns, however, this Article does not rely on Coase's
theory. No empirical support for the theory as an explanation of settle-
ment patterns exists.33 More importantly, the theory suffers from an
important flaw: it applies an argument originally established under dif-
ferent liability rules to an inappropriate setting. To be more specific,
the Coase theorem demonstrates that in a regime of frictionless bar-
gaining the parties will adopt the cost-minimizing set of precautions,
regardless of the liability rule in effect. In other words, if the rule in
effect is strict liability, the parties may negotiate a waiver of liability if
such an arrangement is wealth maximizing, with appropriate side pay-
ments exchanged.
In the litigation problem Donohue analyzed, the parties attempting
to settle their case are doing something analogous to negotiating a
waiver of liability. The notion that they might contractually arrange for
a different fee shifting rule would require the parties to suspend settle-
ment negotiations in order to negotiate over a fee shifting rule that
maximizes wealth, in the event that they choose to litigate. How likely
is this to occur? Would not the offeree doubt the sincerity of the of-
feror's professed desire to settle the dispute if the offeror proposes
adopting a new fee shifting rule if settlement negotiations fail? Would
not such an offer be taken as a signal of a desire to litigate under the
proposed fee shifting rule?
This general criticism applies to the Coase theorem as well. Some
contractual provisions signal to the other party an intention not to com-
ply with the general aim of the contract; 4 by proposing such provisions
parties may shoot themselves in the foot. For example, a sports player
may be reluctant to propose an injury clause, for fear that the proposal
will be taken as a sign of a "malingering" nature.3 " The critique applies
33. Id.
34. See Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 Rand J. Econ. 432, 433
(1992).
35. This is a nice example mentioned in Spier, 23 Rand J. Econ. at 433. Spier argues that
merely asking for certain types of contractual provisions may signal 'important characteristics of
the proponent. This signal is important in an environment in which characteristics are not observ-
able. If a sports player signals that he is a malingerer, then the team owner will reassess the terms
of the contract in light of this signal. In an equilibrium in which only malingerers ask to be paid in
full while injured, contracts generally will fail to include such injury clauses.
Barry Nalebuff introduced the intuition behind Spier's argument in the litigation context. See
Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 Rand J. Econ. 198 (1987). Nalebuff's argument
runs as follows: Suppose that plaintiffs cannot observe the "value" of their claims but defendants
can. In order to maintain the credibility of their claims to sue, plaintiffs generally will overstate
their damages. To ask for too little, in Nalebuff's model, would risk revealing that the plaintiff's
threat to sue is not credible. Id. at 198-99.
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with even greater force to the analysis of settlement negotiations be-
cause a strong tension exists between the aim of settlement negotiations
and the aim of negotiations for the purpose of adopting an alternative
fee shifting rule; one seeks to avoid court, the other pushes the parties
into the courtroom.36 Because the aims are contradictory, it is unlikely
that parties will attempt simultaneously to settle their dispute and to
adopt a wealth-maximizing fee shifting rule. The Coase theorem argu-
ment applies only to those cases in which the parties have determined
that they will litigate.
The Mause-Shavell analysis of fee shifting leaves several important
questions unresolved. The central unresolved issue is this: What deter-
mines the parties' estimates of the probability of a plaintiff victory?
The process of expectation formation is called into question at two
levels. At the settlement level, the comparison of the incentives gener-
ated by the British and American rules in the Mause-Shavell analysis
implicitly assumes that the parties' probability estimates are the same
under the two fee shifting rules. If the fee shifting rule affects expecta-
tions regarding the trial outcome, however, this assumption would be
inappropriate. The process of expectation formation is also called into
question in the analysis of the frequency with which suit is brought
under the alternative fee shifting mechanisms. The analysis reveals that
suit is more likely under the British rule than under the American rule
if the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of victory exceeds the de-
fendant's share of the total cost of litigation. But how is the plaintiff's
estimate of the probability of victory determined? It is impossible to
say whether suit or settlement is more likely under either rule without
answering these questions, and the Mause-Shavell analysis fails to pro-
vide an answer.
2. The Rational Expectations-Asymmetric Information Model
This subpart presents a model of litigation that explicitly takes
into account the formation of expectations regarding trial outcome." In
this model, the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of victory is deter-
mined either by the equilibrium frequency with which injurers violate
36. An inherent tension exists between the types of agreements or provisions being negoti-
ated. Spier and Nalebuff have argued that contractual incompleteness results because certain re-
quests may reveal the asker's "type." See, for example, Nalebuff, 18 Rand J. Econ. at 199. This
Article argues that contractual incompleteness may result because provision A is inconsistent with
provision B, and any party who attempts to carry on bargaining about A and B simultaneously will
risk signaling a lack of real interest in one of the provisions.
37. For a more detailed and technically oriented presentation of the model, see Hylton, 22 J.
Legal Stud. at 455 (cited in note 5). This Article extends the analysis in that paper by carrying out
a wider variety of simulations of the model.
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the legal standard3 8 or by private information held by the plaintiff re-
garding the defendant's compliance with the legal standard. Similarly,
the defendant's estimate of the probability of victory is determined ei-
ther by the equilibrium frequency of violations or by private informa-
tion held by the defendant concerning his compliance with the legal
standard. In this model, a comparison of the American and British rules
requires a comparison of the equilibrium compliance rates under the
two regimes. The model also allows for the possibility of legal error.
a. Assumptions
Let W represent the probability, given an injury, that the injurer
did not comply with the relevant legal standard. In the area of negli-
gence law, W would represent the probability that the defendant was
negligent, given an accident causing injury. In antitrust, W would re-
present the probability that the defendant violated the Sherman Act.
Let Q1 represent the probability of type one error-that is, that the
court erroneously fails to hold a defendant liable. Let Q2 represent the
probability of type two error-that is, that the court erroneously holds
a defendant liable. The model assumes that Q1 and Q are public infor-
mation. These assumptions generate four "information regimes":
Plaintiff uninformed, defendant informed. In this regime the
plaintiff estimates the probability of a verdict in his favor by averaging
over the populations of innocent and guilty injurers (where "innocence"
and "guilt" indicate whether or not the defendant has violated the ap-
plicable legal standard). In the case of an innocent injurer, the
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff is simply the probability of type
two error. For a guilty injurer, the probability of a verdict for the plain-
tiff is simply one minus the likelihood of type one error. Thus, the ra-
tional estimate for the uninformed plaintiff of the likelihood of a
verdict in his favor is PP = W(1 - Q) + (1 - W)Q2. Since the defendant
is informed, his estimate of the probability of a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff is one minus the probability of type one error if the defendant
is guilty (that is, Pd = 1 - Q1 if the defendant is guilty of violating the
38. In the terms of economics literature, the plaintiff makes a rational expectations estimate
of the probability of victory. Rational expectations in its mildest form assumes that subjective
frequency expectations are equal to objective frequencies in equilibrium. A stronger form assumes
that agents are familiar with the process that generates observed frequencies and that they use
that information in making forecasts. The theory has been applied largely in macroeconomics liter-
ature, starting with John F. Muth, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, 29
Econometrica 315 (1961).
For a model of litigation in which plaintiffs make rational expectations estimates of the
probability of victory, see I.P.L. Png, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell J.
Econ. 539, 540-44 (1983); I.P.L. Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, 34 J. Pub.
Econ. 61 (1987).
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legal standard). If the defendant is innocent, his estimate of the likeli-
hood of a verdict for the plaintiff is simply the probability of type two
error (that is, Pd = Q if the defendant is innocent).
Plaintiff informed, defendant uninformed. The plaintiff's estimate
of the probability of a verdict in his favor is P = 1 - Q1 if the defend-
ant violated the legal standard and Pd = Q2 if the defendant did not
violate the legal standard. The defendant's estimate of the probability
of a verdict in his favor is Pd = W(1 - Q1) + (1 - W)Q2, whether or not
he violated the legal standard.
Both parties uninformed. The plaintiff's estimate of the
probability of a verdict in his favor is Pp = W(1 - Q) + (1 - W)Q2; the
defendant's estimate of the probability of a verdict in the plaintiff's
favor is the same.
Both parties informed. The plaintiff's estimate of the probability
of a verdict in his favor is P = 1 - Q, if the defendant violated the
legal standard, and the defendant's estimate is the same in this circum-
stance. Similarly, if the defendant did not violate the legal standard,
then both the plaintiff and the defendant will estimate that the
probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff is Q,.
This Article extends the Mause-Shavell analysis by examining the
incentive to settle under alternative fee rules within the first three in-
formation regimes.3 9
b. The Incentive to Settle
The settlement-versus-litigation question arises only if the plaintiff
is willing to bring suit; therefore, assume in this subpart that the plain-
tiff has an incentive to bring suit. The previous subpart introduced the
three informational regimes; this subpart will further discuss the differ-
ences between the regimes because the differences have important im-
plications for the settlement problem.
Recall that under the American rule, the parties will choose to liti-
gate rather than settle if, given suit, the difference between the per-
ceived stakes exceeds the total cost of litigation.40 The information
regime assumptions become important at this stage. Suppose the de-
fendant is the informed party and knows that he is guilty. Then the
39. This Article does not examine the regime in which both parties are informed because it is
uninteresting. The analysis in the preceding subpart leads to the conclusion that all cases will
settle in a regime in which both parties are informed. Further, because the parties are assumed to
have all relevant information before trial occurs, there is no reason to think that differences in
estimates will result from information transmitted during settlement negotiations. For further dis-
cussion of this issue, see notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
40. More precisely, the parties will choose to litigate rather than settle if (ppA - PdA)j > (Cp
+ Cd). See text accompanying note 29.
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difference between the perceived stakes is negative;"1 thus, the parties
have an incentive to settle. Suppose the plaintiff is the informed party
and knows that the defendant is not guilty. Because the difference be-
tween the perceived stakes again is negative,"2 the parties have an in-
centive to settle. Thus, if the defendant knows that he is guilty, he will
always have an incentive to settle the dispute. Similarly, if plaintiffs are
informed, then all plaintiffs facing innocent defendants will seek to set-
tle their disputes.
It follows from the foregoing analysis that information regimes de-
termine settlement incentives. These incentives are examined in each
information regime below.
Defendant informed, plaintiff uninformed. Recall that if the de-
fendant is the informed party, he will always seek to settle the dispute
when he is guilty. If guilty defendants always settle, however, then liti-
gation would involve only innocent defendants. Such a situation could
not be an equilibrium because innocent defendants would effectively re-
veal their status by refusing settlement demands. Once informed of the
status of innocent defendants, plaintiffs would lower their settlement
demands accordingly and settlement would occur. Litigation would
never occur.
43
So why does litigation occur? Literature has identified strategic be-
havior as the reason.4' One form of strategic behavior is a defendant's
desire to litigate in order to establish a reputation or to change the legal
rule in a desired direction.' 5 If this were the only type of strategic be-
havior, however, the puzzle would remain because litigants who wish to
change the legal rule or establish reputations as contestants are often
identifiable at an early stage. A second type of strategic behavior results
from efforts to obtain a larger share of the settlement surplus.4' Settle-
41. To see this, note that pp. pd = W(1 - Q1) + (1 - W)Q - (1 - Qj) < 0.
42. Note that if the defendant is informed and is not guilty, then (ppA - PdA)j = (Q,.PdA)J
<0.
43. This process of full information disclosure is analogous to another indirect disclosure pro-
cess considered in literature on the economics of information. Suppose a seller has information on
the quality of a product that the buyer is unable to observe but easily can verify. The market then
will generate full disclosure. All sellers with favorable information will disclose, leaving only those
with unfavorable information refusing to disclose. Buyers will then assume the worst of non-dis-
closing sellers, and prices will fully reflect quality. See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad
News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 Bell J. Econ. 380, 387-90 (1981).
44. See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, and Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1982); Png, 14 Bell J.
Econ. at 539 (cited in note 38); Png, 34 J. Pub. Econ. at 61 (cited in note 38); Kathryn E. Spier,
The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 93 (1992); Hylton, 22 J. Legal Stud. at
187 (cited in note 29).
45. See Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 205 (1982).
46. Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin emphasized this type of strategic behavior. See Cooter,
Marks, and Mnookin, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 225 (cited in note 44).
1084 [Vol. 46:1069
ment cannot occur in some cases because both parties adopt hard bar-
gaining strategies in order to maximize their share of the savings from
settling rather than litigating the dispute. This explanation of litigation
is problematic: if parties often failed to settle because they could not
agree on a division of the settlement surplus, presumably "split the dif-
ference" norms would develop that would allow parties to avoid
litigation.47
A third type of strategic behavior-signaling behavior-offers hope
of explaining ordinary litigation. s Suppose only innocent defendants
refused to accept plaintiffs' "reasonable" settlement demands (that is,
those demands within the settlement zone for guilty defendants).
Guilty defendants would then have an incentive to reject settlement de-
mands within the same range in order to fool plaintiffs into thinking
they are innocent. If, on the other hand, all guilty defendants tried to
signal innocence by rejecting settlement demands, then rejection would
lose its value as a signal of innocence. In equilibrium one should expect
some fraction of guilty defendants to reject settlement demands,"9 and
in order for the signal to retain its value one should expect this fraction
to be relatively small. Given strategic rejections on the part of guilty
defendants, plaintiffs will be reluctant to lower their settlement de-
mands to a range that would allow all innocent defendants to accept
plaintiffs' demands. In the end, litigation may result.
This is not the end of the litigation puzzle because at this stage this
Article has done nothing more than use the signaling argument to jus-
tify litigation between uninformed plaintiffs and innocent defendants.
The question that remains is whether guilty defendants will ever liti-
gate. The question is troubling because at the end of settlement negoti-
47. For example, the plaintiff and the defendant may quickly agree to split the settlement
surplus in half. The theoretical foundation for such a resolution is the Nash bargaining solution.
See John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 Econometrica 155 (1950). For an application of the
Nash bargaining solution to the settlement problem, see Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in
Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev. 383, 410-11 (1989).
48. See Png, 34 J. Pub. Econ. at 61 (cited in note 38); Spier, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. at 93 (cited
in note 44); Hylton, 22 J. Legal Stud. at 312 (cited in note 29).
49. Using game theory terminology, the equilibrium condition is this: The two "pure" strate-
gies-acceptance and rejection-must have the same expected payoff to a guilty defendant. If re-
jection loses its value as a signal of innocence, guilty defendants will not have an incentive to
reject. If, on the other hand, no guilty defendants reject, the signaling value of rejection should be
very strong, which would lead some guilty defendants to start rejecting demands. The equilibrium
proportion of guilty defendants who reject settlement demands is that proportion which equates
the expected payoff from rejection with the expected payoff from acceptance of the plaintiff's set-
tlement demand. For a non-technical elaboration of this argument, see Hylton, 22 J. Legal Stud. at
195 (cited in note 29). For more technical elaborations, see Png, 14 Bell J. Econ. at 539 (cited in
note 38), and Spier, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. at 93 (cited in note 44).
FEE SHIFTING 10851993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ations, guilty defendants should prefer to settle rather than face a
judgment.
Two reasons can be offered for litigation by guilty defendants.
First, some plaintiffs break off settlement negotiations early and pursue
a strategy of litigation, even though the trial date has not arrived. Sec-
ond, because of the possibility of appeal, a defendant may not perceive
the end period of settlement negotiations during a trial as the real end
period. If the defendant expects to appeal and to have the judgment
reduced, he may have an incentive to reject settlement demands even in
the final period of negotiations at the trial court level. The upshot of
this analysis is that because of strategic signaling behavior, litigation
will occur, some of it involving guilty defendants.
Calculating the proportions of innocent and guilty defendants in
equilibrium is a complicated task. This Article aims only to compare
cost allocation regimes in terms of the amount of litigation produced by
each regime, not to describe in detail the equilibrium under each re-
gime' In making this comparison, the Article adopts the simplifying as-
sumption that the frequency of litigation in each cost allocation regime
is directly proportional to the number of disputes in which the settle-
ment zone is empty. Given this assumption, the probability of litigation
is equal to the probability that the parties choose to litigate (that is,
that the settlement zone is empty) multiplied by the probability that
the defendant is innocent. Under the American rule, the probability of
litigation, given an injury, is
Prob[(PpA - Pd)J > (Cp + Cd)]( 1 - WA),
where WA is the probability of non-compliance under the American
rule. Under the British rule the probability of litigation, given an in-
jury, is
Prob[(PpB - Pd)J > (1 - ppB + pd)(Cp + Cd)]( 1 - WB),
where WB is the probability of non-compliance under the British rule.
Similar formulae can be used to compare the settlement probability
under the American rule with the settlement probability under the
Proplaintiff and Prodefendant rules50
50. Under the Proplaintiff rule, the probability of litigation, given an injury, is
Prob[(P P - Pd)J > (1 - PpP + Pd)Cp + Cd](1 - Wp,
where WP is the probability of non-compliance under the Proplaintiff rule. Under the
Prodefendant rule, the probability of litigation, given an injury is
Prob[(PpD - Pd)J > (1 - ppD + Pd)Cd + Cp ](1 - WD),
where WD is the probability of non-compliance under the Prodefendant rule.
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Plaintiff informed, defendant uninformed. The litigation puzzle
discussed above also occurs in the case in which the plaintiff is the in-
formed party. Recall that when the plaintiff is informed and the de-
fendant is uninformed, all disputes involving innocent defendants
should settle because no rational plaintiff will have an incentive to liti-
gate against a defendant the plaintiff knows to be innocent. Again, this
proposition suggests that litigation will not occur in equilibrium. If liti-
gation involves only guilty defendants, plaintiffs will adjust their settle-
ment demands to reflect this fact. In equilibrium all disputes would
settle.
Again, strategic signaling behavior produces litigation. It is the sig-
naling behavior of the plaintiff, however, that leads to litigation in this
scenario. The plaintiff, knowing the defendant is innocent, will make
unreasonably high settlement demands in order to fool the innocent de-
fendant into settling on the same terms as a guilty defendant. Given
that the defendant is uninformed, an outcome in which only plaintiffs
who know that they are facing a guilty defendant make high settlement
demands cannot be an equilibrium because a plaintiff facing an inno-
cent defendant will then have an incentive to make a high settlement
demand. For reasons discussed in the examination of the informed de-
fendant and uninformed plaintiff case, the equilibrium should be one in
which a small proportion of the plaintiffs who litigate do so against in-
nocent defendants.
Again, this Article makes the simplifying assumption that the fre-
quency of litigated cases is directly proportional to the number of dis-
putes in which the settlement zone is empty and the defendant is
guilty. Given this assumption, the probability of litigation under the
American rule, assuming an injury, is given by
Prob[(PpA - pd)J > (Cp + Cd)]WA,
where WA represents the probability of non-compliance under the
American rule. Under the British rule the probability of litigation,
given an injury, is
Prob[(PpB - pd)J > (1 - ppB + Pd)(Cp + Cd)]WB,
where WB represents the probability of non-compliance under the Brit-
ish rule.
Both parties uninformed. When both parties are uninformed and
have access to the same information, their rational expectations esti-
mates of the probability of a verdict in the plaintiff's favor should be
the same. It follows that they will never litigate because the difference
in the parties' estimates of the expected judgment for the plaintiff is
zero.
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This information regime also should be analyzed under a different
theory of litigation, one that draws on Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin.51
They hypothesized that litigation has two causes: (1) random or idio-
syncratic errors in estimation that produce differences in the parties'
expectations of awards, and (2) strategic behavior with respect to the
settlement stakes (or the surplus from settlement).2 In the information
regimes examined earlier in this Part, litigation resulted because the
settlement zone was empty; the settlement zone in turn was empty be-
cause of informational asymmetry. Parties were assumed to estimate ra-
tionally the likelihood of the plaintiff winning so that informational
asymmetry provided the only possible source of differences in
expectations."
Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin assumed that parties make rational
expectations estimates of the likelihood of the plaintiff winning and
that both parties generally have access to the same information in
forming their expectations."" Parties generally form expectations on the
basis of observable traits; certain unobservable traits exist, however,
which lead parties to adopt tactics that deviate from expected strate-
gies. Thus, although expectations are accurate with respect to the aver-
age or typical party, they might be inaccurate with respect to any
individual.5 These random deviations between expected and actual be-
havioral patterns produce litigation of two types. First, the random de-
viations yield cases in which the settlement zone is empty. Second, the
random deviations lead to litigation even when the settlement zone is
not empty because parties make strategic efforts to grab as large a share
of the settlement surplus as possible. Because parties sometimes incor-
rectly predict their opponents' behavior, litigation results.5 6
This model makes no attempt to allow for strategic behavior in
splitting the settlement surplus; it allows for only one component of the
Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin model: random deviations between expec-
tations and actual status that result in instances in which the settle-
ment zone is empty. To formalize this approach, this model assumes
that before an injury occurs, the parties have the same expectations of
51. Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 225 (cited in note 44).
52. Id. at 229-32.
53. It should be noted that this proposition is quite different from the assumptions of the
earlier literature in this area, which took the view that litigation results from excessive optimism
on the part of plaintiffs and defendants. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 435-38
(Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1977); Shavell, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 55 (cited in note 26). The model
presented in this Article nowhere assumes excessive optimism, but rather assumes that all expecta-
tions are rational.
54. Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 231-32 (cited in note 44).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 246.
[Vol. 46:10691088
FEE SHIFTING
the likelihood of the plaintiff winning if an injury followed by a trial
should occur. The model further assumes that information revealed af-
ter the injury leads to random differences in expectations. The model
therefore introduces an error term E that represents the difference be-
tween the parties' estimates of the probability of a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff. The Appendix provides a detailed explanation of the as-
sumptions underlying this model.
III. LITIGATION MODEL SIMULATION RESULTS
The Rational Expectations-Asymmetric Information model as-
sumes that the relevant legal standard is negligence. The aim of the
exercise is to compute the probability of non-compliance (the propor-
tion of injurers who fail to comply with the legal standard) and the
probability of litigation under each of the four fee shifting rules consid-
ered. In interpreting the results, one should think of the probability of
non-compliance as analogous to an equilibrium price in a market model.
Its equilibrium value is the level at which plaintiffs' expectations of suc-
cess are consistent with the frequency of non-compliance in the popula-
tion of potential injurers after discounting for error in the courts.
Details of the model are provided in the Appendix; its most basic fea-
tures are described below.
The model assumes that an injurer can reduce the probability of an
accident occurring by taking care and that taking care is costly. Let the
cost to a potential injurer of taking care be x. If the potential injurer
takes care, the probability of an injury to a victim is q. If the potential
injurer does not exercise care, the probability of an injury is p, and p >
q. Let v be the loss a victim suffers if an injury occurs. According to the
Hand formula, the injurer has acted negligently if he fails to take care,
an accident occurs, and the condition (p-q)v > x holds. Further, the
model assumes that litigation is costly and that courts occasionally err
in determining negligence. The simulations assume that victims and in-
jurers act rationally. Thus, victims bring suit only if the expected cost
of litigating is less than the expected award; potential injurers take care
only if the expected liability (the sum of liability to victims and ex-
pected litigation costs) is greater than the cost of taking care. In equi-
librium, the probability of non-compliance is equal to the rate at which
injurers fail to comply with the due care standard. The equations
describing these incentive conditions are presented in the Appendix.
A. Non-Compliance Rates
The simulations presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the non-
compliance rates under alternative informational regimes generated by
1089
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
simulating the negligence litigation model. The simulations used several
combinations of numerical values for the accident probabilities, p and
q. The simulations shown in the Figures assume that p =.75 and q
=.25. 57
Information Regime 1: Defendant informed, plaintiff uninformed.
The results are presented in Figure 1. Non-compliance rates rise with
litigation costs under each of the fee rules in Figure 1 because the effect
of litigation costs on the probability that suit will be brought is the
dominant influence on equilibrium compliance in this model."
Information Regime 2: Neither party informed. Figure 2 presents
results for the case in which neither party has an informational advan-
tage. The results are similar to those in the case in which the plaintiff
has the informational advantage. The Proplaintiff rule results in the
highest compliance rates, the Prodefendant rule the lowest. The Ameri-
can and British rules yield roughly equal compliance rates, with the
British slightly outperforming the American rule at high litigation cost
levels and the American outperforming the British at low litigation cost
levels.
Information Regime 3: Plaintiff informed, defendant uninformed.
The general ranking of the cost allocation regimes in terms of their in-
fluence on incentives to comply is the same as the ranking in the previ-
ous two information regimes. Figure 3 presents several novel features:
the non-compliance rates hit zero fairly quickly under the Proplaintiff
rule, and they fall as litigation costs rise under the British rule. This
fact results in a large divergence in compliance rates between the Brit-
ish and American rules at high cost levels.59
The zero non-compliance rates under the Proplaintiff rule are eas-
ily explained. The plaintiff has the informational advantage, and fees
are shifted exclusively in his favor under this rule. Thus, the plaintiff
57. The results based on other values of p and q were basically the same. For discussion of
these results, see Hylton, 22 J. Legal Stud. at 465 (cited in note 5).
58. For further discussion of the American and British rules, see id. at 469.
59. Since Figure 3 differs from the previous two figures, a more detailed explanation of the
results is necessary. Two influences explain the curves in Figure 3: one is the informational advan-
tage enjoyed by plaintiffs; the other is the costliness of litigation. At low litigation cost levels, the
informational advantage effect outweighs all other influences. Guilty defendants face a high
probability of suit from injured victims as a result and therefore have strong incentives to comply.
The incentives increase as the costliness of litigation increases because, in expectation, defendants
bear some portion of the costs under each cost allocation rule. At some point, as the diagram
reveals, the costliness of litigation becomes such a burden on plaintiffs that they bring suits less
frequently. Thus, under the American rule, at a certain point the cost of litigation begins to bur-
den plaintiffs to such a degree that the rate at which they sue falls. As a result, defendants' ex-
pected total liability decreases commensurately. At this point, the rate of compliance also starts to
fall (that is, the non-compliance rate increases) and continues to fall as the costliness of suit
increases.
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has an unusally strong incentive to sue defendants who are guilty of
violating the legal standard. Overcompliance results among potential in-
jurers for cost levels above half the average injury award.
The British rule performs better in terms of compliance than does
the American rule for the same reason as that given for the perform-
ance of the Proplaintiff rule. Because the plaintiff has the informational
advantage, the British rule provides very strong incentives to sue guilty
defendants, and the incentives strengthen as the cost levels increase.
Because plaintiffs face the risk of being forced to pay the litigation
costs of defendants, the incentive to sue is not as strong as under the
Proplaintiff rule. For this reason the British rule provides a milder in-
fluence on incentives to comply than does the Proplaintiff rule.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Figure 1
British
Prodefendant
Proplaintiff
American
Notes to Figures 1, 2, and 3
1. The horizontal axis measures a plaintiff's or defendant's cost of litigating as a mul-
tiple of the average loss from injury.
2. The vertical axis measures the probability of non-compliance.
0.7-
0.6-
0.5-
0.4-
0.3-
0.2-
0.1
0o
1.5
cp, cd
[Vol. 46:10691092
0:0'
-------------------------------------------------------------
r:.Uw
lww!lwl aa -
---------------------------------- ............... . ........................
...................... ....... .................................... .......
.............. .. ................... .........................................
-------- ...... .............................................................
...... .... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993]
0.65
0.6-
0.55-
0.5-
0.45-
0.4-
0.35-
0.3-
0.25
0 1.5
1.5
cp, cd
Figure 3
1093FEE SHIFTING
Figure 2
British
-Ul--
Prodefendant
Proplaintiff
American
British
Prodefendant
Proplaintiff
American
0.5
0.5 1.5 2.5
cp, cd
I.. . .......
................................  ...............
................... .... .............................................
............. ... .................................... ...
..... ..... .......................... . ............................
.................... ................................................
.......................................................................
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Frequency of Litigation
Using the equilibrium non-compliance rates, the simulation calcu-
lated the probability of litigation under the litigation cost allocation
rules. This subpart presents the results under each information regime.
Information Regime 1: Defendant informed, plaintiff uninformed.
The results are presented in Figure 4. The Prodefendant and British
rules are fairly similar, with the Prodefendant rule generating the most
litigation at low litigation cost levels and the British rule generating the
most at high cost levels (that is, at cost levels above one and one-half
times the average award). The Proplaintiff rule generates the least liti-
gation at all cost levels. Thus, the cost allocation rules may be ranked
as follows (from the rule under which settlement is most likely to the
one under which it is least likely): Proplaintiff, American,
Prodefendant, British. This ranking should be compared to the ranking
derived by Steven Shavell, who has presented the only previous ranking
of fee shifting regimes. Examining the effects of cost shifting on the
perceived stakes, Shavell demonstrated that the litigation cost systems
can be ranked in the following order (from the rule under which settle-
ment is most likely to the one under which it is least likely): (1) Ameri-
can, (2) Prodefendant and Proplaintiff, (3) British.0
Information Regime 2: Neither party informed. Figure 5 presents
the probability of litigation under the regime in which neither party has
an informational advantage. The British rule generates the most litiga-
tion and the American rule the least. The Prodefendant and Proplain-
tiff rules generate the same level of litigation. Because parties'
estimates of the likelihood of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff are
roughly equal under this informational regime, the results essentially
confirm those of Steven Shavell.61
Information Regime 3: Plaintiff informed, defendant uninformed.
The results for the regime in which the plaintiff has the informational
advantage are shown in Figure 6. The following ranking emerges (from
least to most litigious): Proplaintiff, American, Prodefendant, British.
Interestingly, the rate of litigation under the Proplaintiff rule falls to
zero at the point at which cost is equal to one-half the average damage
award. The explanation is as follows: No guilty defendants are found in
this regime at cost levels above one-half6" because defendants are
overcomplying at this range of litigation cost levels. Thus, both plain-
tiffs who know the defendant's true status and defendants who must
60. Shavell, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 55 (cited in note 26). It should be noted that Shaven's
ranking is based on the assumption that the defendant's litigation cost is equal to the plaintiff's.
61. For Shavell's ranking, see text accompanying note 60.
62. See Figure 3.
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estimate the probability of their innocence will be aware in equilibrium
that the probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff is equal to the
rate of erroneous verdicts for the plaintiff. Because their expectations of
the trial outcome will be the same, they will settle.
Figure 4
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C. General Conclusions
The simulations lead to the general conclusion that the Proplaintiff
rule provides the greatest incentives for compliance with the legal stan-
dard; this is because the Proplaintiff rule provides victims the greatest
degree of access to the courts. For the same reason the Prodefendant
rule provides the weakest incentives for potential injurers to comply.
The American and British rules generally are close in terms of their
influence on compliance incentives except in the regime in which the
plaintiff has the informational advantage. In that regime the British
rule provides significantly stronger compliance incentives than does the
American rule when the cost of litigating is high.
In spite of its tendency to encourage suit, the results suggest that
the Proplaintiff rule generates the least litigation. In two of the three
informational regimes examined, the Proplaintiff rule generated uni-
formly lower litigation probabilities than did the other cost allocation
rules. The conclusion that the Proplaintiff rule tends to generate the
least litigation may seem counterintuitive because the Proplaintiff rule
goes further than the other rules in encouraging victims to bring suit.
Certainly the common intuition is that pro-plaintiff fee shifting gener-
ates litigation. This intuitive proposition would be valid under a strict
liability system in which the probability of compliance is not an issue.
The proposition is incorrect, however, when compliance with a standard
of conduct is the issue that determines liability. In this situation the
Proplaintiff rule encourages both suit and settlement. The rule encour-
ages settlement because low non-compliance rates result in low pre-
dicted probabilities of success, which in turn reduce the settlement gap
between plaintiffs and defendants.
D. Implications
1. Economic Efficiency
This Article has not proven that pro-plaintiff fee shifting is eco-
nomically efficient; it has only shown that, within the confines of the
model examined, pro-plaintiff fee shifting simultaneously promotes
compliance and settlement more effectively than does any other fee
shifting rule. One might determine the efficiency of pro-plaintiff fee
shifting by examining whether it minimizes the sum of the costs of in-
jury, injury avoidance, and litigation. 3 The analysis would necessarily
be incomplete, however, because an infinite number of aspects of social
63. The text describes the operational efficiency norm applied to tort law in Guido Calabresi,
The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 28-29 (Yale U., 1970).
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welfare exist that an efficiency analysis could take into account. For ex-
ample, the risk aversion of litigants may influence the optimal fee shift-
ing rule. 4
Although this Article has made no effort to answer the efficiency
question, one may draw some implications from the simulation results.
Assume that efficiency requires minimization of the costs of injury, in-
jury avoidance, and litigation; assume further that parties are risk neu-
tral. The results in which the non-compliance frequency remains
positive for all litigation cost levels,"5 and in which the Proplaintiff rule
minimizes the probability of non-compliance and the probability of liti-
gation, suggest that the Proplaintiff rule is economically efficient. The
reason is as follows: If the non-compliance rate is positive, then it is
socially desirable that more potential injurers take care.66 Pro-plaintiff
fee shifting is superior in this regard to rules that lead to less caretak-
ing. If pro-plaintiff fee shifting leads to increased caretaking and also
minimizes litigation, it is efficient. This analysis implies that pro-plain-
tiff fee shifting is efficient in information regimes in which the plaintiff
is uninformed since the probability of non-compliance remains positive
over all litigation cost levels in the results for these regimes. In the re-
gime in which the plaintiff is the informed party, it is not clear that
pro-plaintiff fee shifting is economically efficient because the Proplain-
tiff rule leads to overcompliance on the part of potential injurers, which
implies that it may be socially desirable to have fewer potential injurers
take care. Without parameter values that could be used to evaluate
tradeoffs between deterrence benefits and litigation cost increases, it is
impossible to determine whether pro-plaintiff fee shifting is economi-
cally efficient.
A somewhat less tentative conclusion suggested by the simulation
results is that pro-plaintiff fee shifting is likely to produce the benefits
64. See John J. Donohue III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoreti-
cal Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 195, 202-09
(1991). Consideration of risk aversion generally will lend support to the American rule because the
alternative rules make litigation riskier. Under the efficiency norm described in the text, risk aver-
sion in litigation could be considered one of the "costs" of litigation.
Risk aversion in litigation is simply one of a potentially infinite number of costs that could (or
should) be considered in an efficiency analysis. Under the heading "costs of injury," for example,
one could require an efficiency analyst to consider the demoralization that results from the realiza-
tion that not all injury costs will be compensated.
65. See Figures 1 and 2.
66. Non-compliance in this model means that the defendant fails to take care when the cost
of taking care (on the margin) is less than the expected harm to victims from the defendant's
failure to take care (on the margin). It follows that compliance is socially desirable. If litigation
costs are taken into account, then overcompliance is socially desirable. For a demonstration of this
claim, see Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J. L. Econ. &
Org. 433 (1990).
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demonstrated in this Article in a wide variety of legal regimes. That is,
the positive results of pro-plaintiff fee shifting are not limited to negli-
gence litigation because the model of negligence used in this Article is
general enough to be applied to other standards of conduct defined by
law. Most legal rules are standards of conduct that require the court to
weigh specified social costs against specified social benefits before find-
ing a violation. For example, consider the Rule of Reason in antitrust
analysis, which generally requires a comparison of the social costs and
social benefits of an alleged restraint of trade.6 7 If the social costs out-
weigh the social benefits, the defendant has violated the antitrust laws.
It would require only a redefinition of terms used in the model defined
in the previous Part to demonstrate the model's applicability to litiga-
tion under the Rule of Reason standard in antitrust. Products liability
law provides another example of the applicability of the negligence
standard used in this model. Although products liability is often de-
scribed as an area in which liability is strict, the risk utility test applied
in defective design cases requires a weighing of the social costs and ben-
efits of redesigning the product.6 8 Because courts generally apply bal-
ancing tests of some sort in determining liability or legality, the
negligence model examined in this Article probably has implications
that are valid for many areas in which the legal test is not a negligence
test.
2. Efficiency Versus Fairness
One of the earliest objections to fee shifting claimed that in view of
the uncertainty of litigation it would be "unfair" to force the loser to
pay the litigation costs of the prevailing party."9 The argument never
gathered much steam, however; commentators seem to have discarded
it after Arthur Goodhart summarily rejected it.7o The results of the
model presented in this Article provide new insights on the fairness
argument.
The nub of the fairness critique is that it is possible under a system
of pro-plaintiff fee shifting that innocent parties may be forced to pay
67. For an example, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-57
(1977) (discussing the tradeoff between promotion of interbrand and intrabrand competition).
68. See, for example, Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 788 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1986);
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.,
Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321
A.2d 737 (1974); W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 99 at 699 &
n.30 (West, 5th ed. 1984).
69. See A. G. Sedgwick, Elements of Damages 37-38 (Little, Brown, 1896); Linton Satter-
thwaite, Increasing Costs to be Paid by Losing Party, 46 N.J. L. J. 133 (1923).
70. See Arthur Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L. J. 849, 877 (1929) (claiming that if litigation is
"so much a matter of luck.., it would be cheaper, and certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin").
1993] 1099
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
costs at a surprisingly high rate. To see this, assume that the defendant
has the informational advantage in litigation. Then, as the previous
Part argued, guilty defendants generally will be willing to settle while
innocent defendants will not.7 1 The previous Part also argued that in
equilibrium a high fraction, though not one hundred percent, of litigat-
ing defendants will be innocent. Let a represent the fraction of inno-
cent defendants who litigate to judgment. Then the fraction of losing
defendants (those forced to pay costs) who are innocent is given by
aQ2/[aQ, + (1 - a)(1 - QJ)]
In carrying out the simulations, it was assumed that Q = Q2
1/8.71 Assume further that a = 9/10. Under these assumptions, fifty-six
percent of losing defendants are innocent. In the information regime in
which defendants have the advantage, the percentage of losing defend-
ants who are innocent will be much higher than in the other informa-
tion regimes. For example, if one assumes that in the regime in which
the plaintiff has the advantage a = 1/10, then the percentage of losing
defendants who are innocent is just below two percent.
To tilt the argument in favor of those who would press the fairness
critique, assume further that in most litigation defendants have the in-
formational advantage. Then it is hard to avoid feeling that a system
that forces a losing defendant to pay his opponent's legal expenses is
unfair when in half of the cases the defendant is innocent.
This Article makes no attempt to assess the importance of the fair-
ness critique; its aim is to provide a rigorous underpinning for the argu-
ment. The critique reveals what may be considered an equity-efficiency
tradeoff. The simulation results suggest that compliance is enhanced
and administrative costs are minimized by shifting fees in favor of pre-
vailing plaintiffs. The gains are bought, however, at the expense of forc-
ing some innocent defendants to pay their opponents' costs. Again, in
the absence of a social welfare function it is impossible to determine
whether the potential "fairness costs" of the Proplaintiff rule are too
small to outweigh its potential benefits.
E. Possible Shortcomings: Rationality, Insurance, and Other
Considerations
Two objections may be raised to the litigation model examined in
this Article. First, it incorrectly assumes that all potential injurers act
71. See Part II.B.2.b.
72. Recall that Q1 is the probability that the court would erroneously fail to hold the defend-
ant liable, and Q, is the probability that the court would erroneously hold the defendant liable.
The choice of '/s is based on the brief survey provided in Gordon Tullock, Trials on Trial: The
Pure Theory of Legal Procedure 31-33 (Columbia U., 1980).
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rationally, always weighing costs against benefits when deciding
whether to take care. Second, it fails to take into account the influence
of insurance on the caretaking incentives of potential injurers. Consid-
ering the rationality objection first, one can admit that the rationality
assumptions of the model do not accurately describe the behavioral
rules adopted or chosen by all potential injurers. Some actors comply
with legal standards even in situations in which a pure comparision of
expected liability and costs of compliance would lead to non-compli-
ance. 7 Some actors comply with the law largely out of a concern for the
reputational consequences of non-compliance. Others comply because
of their desire to be a "good" person.75 In each of these cases the actors
may be behaving rationally, in the sense that their behavior is governed
by some comparison of costs and benefits. The cost-benefit test gov-
erning their behavior is different, however, from the test assumed in the
model presented in this Article. For example, the potential injurer who
is concerned about reputation may determine his care level by compar-
ing the reputational costs and benefits of taking care, which may lead to
a different conclusion than would a rule requiring a comparison of ex-
pected liability to victims with the immediate costs of compliance. Too
many examples of this kind of compliance exist to assert that the be-
havioral rules specified in this Article describe all potential injurers.
Further, in some cases the potential injurer may choose not to comply
for rational reasons that are not described by the cost-benefit test as-
sumed in the simulated model.
Even if many potential injurers comply for reasons unrelated to a
comparison of expected liability with the cost of care, however, this
73. See, for example, Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale U., 1990) (arguing that
people are more likely to comply with the law when they perceive the legal system to be fair).
Much of the sociological literature has stressed the importance of informal sanctions (for example,
family disapproval) in promoting compliance with the law or norms of conduct. See, for example,
L.S. Anderson, et al., Formal and Informal Sanctions: A Comparison of Deterrent Effects, 25 Soc.
Probs. 103 (1977); Steven R. Burkett and Eric L. Jensen, Conventional Ties, Peer Influence and
the Fear of Apprehension: A Study of Adolescent Marijuana Use, 16 Soc. Q. Bull. 522 (1975);
Donna M. Bishop, Legal and Extralegal Barriers to Delinquency, 22 Criminology 403 (1984).
74. For an economic analysis of the role of reputation in markets, see Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J. L. & Econ. 691 (1983). Kornhauser demon-
strates that reputation can serve as a substitute for law under certain conditions by providing
incentives for parties to comply with their contracts.
75. See Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions
(W.W. Norton & Co., 1988). Robert Frank's work demonstrates that no necessary inconsistency
exists between the theory of rationality and the phenomenon of compliance or cooperation in the
absence of legal compulsion. A reputation for or perception of trustworthiness is valuable because
people prefer to enter into contractual relationships with trustworthy people. It is hard to main-
tain a reputation for trustworthiness, however, unless one makes a commitment to comply with the
law or behave cooperatively even in situations in which short-run self-interest would lead to differ-
ent conduct.
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group is unlikely to represent all potential injurers. Suppose that only a
minority of potential injurers are myopically rational in the sense that
they base their compliance decisions on a comparison of expected liabil-
ity with the cost of compliance. The model presented in this Article
describes the incentives of these actors, and its results are not dimin-
ished in any sense even if myopically rational actors are in the minority.
Presumably the actors who comply even when expected liability is less
than the cost of compliance would comply under any fee shifting or
liability regime. Altering the fee shifting rule cannot affect their behav-
ior. On the other hand, myopically rational actors' behavior can be in-
fluenced, and the changes in the behavior of these actors will determine
the compliance equilibrium. Thus, the results of the model presented in
this Article do not rely on the assumption that all potential tortfeasors
decide their care levels by comparing expected liability against the cost
of care. If only a subset of potential injurers adopted this approach, the
results would be valid.
A second potential shortcoming of the model is its failure to take
into account explicitly the insurance relationship. Many potential injur-
ers carry liability insurance and for this reason may not be as sensitive
to compliance incentives as the model assumes. If this statement is
true, then the only ground for choosing among fee shifting rules is their
effect on litigation. It would be appropriate then to follow the approach
of earlier literature by assuming that perceived probabilities of victory
in litigation are independent of the fee shifting rule in effect.
7 6
The notion that insurance dilutes incentives to take care is based
in large part on an incomplete view of the insurance market, one which
assumes that insurance is largely a risk-spreading mechanism. Many
large corporations, however, purchase insurance even when their share-
holders are well-diversified through the stock market and the compa-
nies themselves are sufficiently diversified with respect to the risk of
tort damages that they should not need to purchase insurance for risk-
spreading reasons. Insurers play important roles in these cases: they
provide information to the insured on the relationship between behav-
ior and accident claims. Further, in bilateral contracting relationships,
insurers provide a more credible source of information than does the
other party to the contract.7 For example, a manufacturing and ship-
ping concern may be large enough to bear easily any losses that might
occur in the process of shipping and to share this risk within the ship-
76. Mause, 55 Iowa L. Rev. at 26 (cited in note 22); Shavell, 11 J. Legal Stud. at 55 (cited in
note 26); Donohue, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1093 (cited in note 30).
77. G6ran Skogh, The Transactions Cost Theory of Insurance: Contracting Impediments
and Costs, 56 J. Risk & Ins. 726, 727-29 (1989).
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ping contract. An information problem, however, does exist: will the
manufacturer rely on the shipper's assessments of the cause of a loss?
When the manufacturer is unwilling to rely on the reports of the party
with whom it has contracted, it may be willing to rely on the reports of
an insurer.
Little reason exists to assume that insurance completely severs the
relationship between incentives and the threat of liability. If only a
weak incentive relationship remains, that relationship may be sufficient
to justify examining the incentive effects of alternative fee shifting
rules. Little evidence exists, however, that the incentive relationship is
weak. Insurers use experience rating and several other instruments to
provide direct incentives for insured parties to minimize losses.7 8 Fur-
ther, the role of the insurer as a provider of information on risk sug-
gests that the insurance firm may enhance incentives to take care by
providing reliable information to insured parties. Since the evidence is
incomplete, readers ultimately must decide for themselves the impor-
tance of this consideration. In any event, it remains useful to consider
the influence of fee shifting in regimes in which compliance incentives
are affected.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEE SHIFTING JURISPRUDENCE
This Part examines the implications of the model's results for the
Supreme Court's decisions on fee shifting. Subpart A below discusses
the general standard that should govern fee awards. Subpart B consid-
ers the standard that should govern the determination of types of litiga-
tion expenses that may be shifted. Subpart C examines the potential
conflict between rules that enhance incentives to comply and rules that
enhance incentives to settle disputes. Because considerable areas over-
lap among the three subparts, the reader should keep in mind that the
subject matter divisions are somewhat artificial.
A. When Should Fees Be Shifted?
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,79 the Su-
preme Court denied federal courts the authority to shift fees under the
"private attorney general" doctrine.8 0 The doctrine, which federal
78. If the price of insurance is perfectly responsive to the level of risk generated by the in-
sured, the experience rating generally will provide the insured with the same incentives to avoid
generating risk that an uninsured party would have. See, for example, Steven Shavell, Economic
Analysis of Accident Law 203-04 (Harvard U., 1987). On the economics of liability insurance pric-
ing, see Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).
79. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
80. For the origin of the private attorney general doctrine, see Newman v. Piggie Park En-
terprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402-03 (1968). Federal courts adopted reasoning similar to that in
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courts had developed in the early 1970s,"1 permits a prevailing plaintiff
to recover fees if he "vindicates a right that (1) benefits a large number
of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal impor-
tance. '8 2 Two doctrines do, however, support the exercise of equitable
fee shifting powers: the common fund88 and bad faith doctrines.8
Because the model's results suggest that society would benefit from
adopting pro-plaintiff fee shifting as a general rule, the results obvi-
ously lend support to the theory underlying the private attorney general
doctrine. When rights benefit a large number of people, special incen-
tive problems arise. Why should any one victim bring suit when he or
she can wait for another victim to bring a suit that establishes the
right?85 Once the right is established, the victim's cost of enforcing the
right is presumably smaller. Future defendants will settle more readily,
and the result of litigation against guilty defendants who are unwilling
to settle will not be uncertain. Of course, if the expected judgment ex-
ceeds the cost of litigating, the victim will gain from bringing suit. If,
however, the suit establishes a right that benefits future plaintiffs, the
victim would gain more by waiting for someone else to sue first. Al-
though not quite a "prisoner's dilemma," one may observe a similar in-
Newman to justify exercising equitable powers to shift fees in civil rights cases in the absence of an
applicable fee shifting statute; these courts developed the private attorney general doctrine. See
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 747 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Evans, 475 U.S. at 747 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Carl Cheng, Note, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 Cal.
L. Rev. 1929, 1929 (1985).
83. The common fund doctrine, while not explicitly requiring fee shifting, authorizes counsel
for "a party preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to
recover his costs, including his attorneys' fees, from the fund or property itself or directly from the
other parties enjoying the benefit." Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257. See also Trustees v. Green-
ough, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 527 (1881). See generally John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary
Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1597 (1974). This judicially created exception
to the American rule is most often applied in securities and antitrust litigation.
84. Another judicially created exception to the American rule, the bad faith doctrine, autho-
rizes a court to "assess attorneys' fees at a minimum for the 'willful disobedience of a court order'
...or when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.'" Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967), and F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. Indus. Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S.
116, 129 (1974)). Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the assessment
of fees against parties or their counsel who merely act unreasonably, has expanded the bad faith
doctrine.
85. Of course, the text describes the public goods theory proposed by Kenneth Dayton in
1933. See Dayton, 167 Annals 32 (cited in note 11). One should note that the text is discussing the
case in which injuries are shared by many, not one in which a single plaintiff sues a single defend-
ant. The case discussed in the text is governed by class action suits. The point, however, is that the
public goods rationale for the class action applies more generally. On the economics of class action
litigation, see Donald N. Dewees, J. Robert S. Prichard, and Michael J. Trebilcock, An Economic
Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for Class Actions, 10 J. Legal Stud. 155 (1981).
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centive structure in this setting.86 Too few victims will bring suit to
establish rights that are uncertain at the moment of injury. Pro-plain-
tiff fee shifting offers a solution to the incentive problem observed in
this setting.8 7 Further, the model's results suggest that the litigation
costs generated by the private attorney general doctrine would not nec-
essarily be greater than would costs in its absence.
The private attorney general doctrine provided a logical comple-
ment to the common fund doctrine.88 The common fund doctrine gov-
erns cases in which the plaintiff's suit preserves or enhances a fund that
exists for the benefit of a well-defined class.89 For example, based on
the doctrine, a plaintiff who brings a shareholder derivative suit and
prevails may collect his attorney's fees from the corporation's funds.90
Courts recognized long ago that this doctrine mitigated the disincentive
to bring suit that results because the costs of the suit are borne by one
party and the benefits shared by many."1 In order to prevent the com-
86. Suppose, for example, that the litigation cost to the plaintiff is $10. Given the uncertain
state of the relevant law, the plaintiff's award will either be $200, which just compensates the
plaintiff, or $0, with a probability of 1/2. The expected award is $100. If the plaintiff waits for
someone else to bring suit and win, the cost falls to $2, and the expected award increases to $200.
Then, if the plaintiff waits to bring suit, his expected net reward is $198 if the other victim sues
and -$200 if the other plaintiff does not sue. If the plaintiff brings suit immediately, his expected
net award is $90 whether or not the other plaintiff sues. While not a prisoner's dilemma, an out-
come in which every plaintiff brings suit immediately is not in equilibrium. If all victims bring suit
immediately, then one victim can gain by delaying until the law has been settled.
87. Note that this benefit is in addition to the benefit provided by reducing litigation costs as
an obstacle to potential plaintiffs. Even in the simple negligence model solved in the previous Part,
litigation provides something like a public good in full and overcompliance equilibria. The reason
is that if no one brought suit, potential defendants would not take care, and full and overcomp-
liance equilibria would be infeasible. For the development of this argument, see Janusz A. Ordover,
Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J. Legal Stud. 243 (1978). See also
Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J. L. Econ. & Org. 433
(1990). In the model developed in the previous Part, the reason litigation occurs in full and in
overcompliance equilibria is that courts sometimes erroneously find defendants negligent.
If one were to modify the previous Part's model to take into account the private attorney
general concerns, one would allow each suit to establish a right that had the effect of lowering the
litigation cost for future plaintiffs. In such a model, a "double disincentive" to sue would exist: the
cost of litigation itself and the fact that early litigants subsidize later ones. The private attorney
general doctrine would lessen the impact of both disincentives.
88. See Cheng, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 1931 (cited in note 82).
89. The common fund doctrine cannot be invoked when the class of beneficiaries is not dis-
crete and easily ascertainable. On the "well-defined class" requirement, see, for example, Petition
of Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1985); Edwards v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 1496, 1503 (9th Cir.
1985).
90. See, for example, Barton v. Drummond Co., 636 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1981); Reiser v. Del
Monte Properties Co., 605 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1979); Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d
1188 (6th Cir. 1974). For an economic analysis, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plain-
tiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986).
91. As the Supreme Court recognized:
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mon fund exception from swallowing the American rule, courts devel-
oped additional rules limiting the applicability of the doctrine in
several ways.9 2 The limitations on the common fund doctrine, however,
are to some extent arbitrary. The public goods problem that arises in
common fund settings also arises in other areas in which litigation gen-
erates a benefit that extends beyond the successful plaintiff.9 The de-
velopment of the private attorney general doctrine can be understood
as an effort to remove arbitrary restrictions on the common fund
theory.
In view of the complementarity of the doctrines, it is hard to un-
derstand why the Court did not discard the common fund doctrine
along with the private attorney general doctrine. 4 As was true of the
private attorney general theory, Congress had not explicitly authorized
the common fund doctrine. 5 The literal approach taken in Alyeska and
more recent cases attempts to freeze fee shifting doctrine in its search
for statutory authorization. The arbitrariness of this approach is evi-
dent when one examines the status of older doctrines such as the com-
mon fund and bad faith theories, which never would have been
permissible bases for fee shifting if the Court had consistently sought
explicit statutory authorization.
The results of the model presented in this Article suggest that the
general standard that should govern fee shifting is one that awards fees
to the successful plaintiff and taxes fees against the unsuccessful plain-
It would be very hard on [the complainant] to turn him away without any allowance except
the paltry sum which could be taxed under the fee-bill. It would not only be unjust to him,
but it would give to the other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an
unfair advantage. He has worked for them as well as for himself; and if he cannot be reim-
bursed out of the fund itself, they ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses
which he has fairly incurred.
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 527, 532 (1881).
92. In addition to the well-defined class requirement, the common fund doctrine cannot nec-
essarily be invoked when the fund or benefit existed prior to litigation that merely clarified the
rights of the parties. See Feick v. Fleener, 653 F.2d 69, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1981). Also, the doctrine
ordinarily cannot be invoked in litigation enforcing a federal statute that does not itself authorize
fees. F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. Indus. Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974).
93. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 282-84 (1975) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
94. The Court's opinion in Alyeska Pipeline describes Trustees v. Greenough as holding that
the 1853 Act specifying taxable costs in federal courts did not interfere with "the historic power of
equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or recovering a fund for
the benefit of others in addition to himself, to recover his costs, including his attorneys' fees."
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257. Justice Marshall's dissent argues that the Court in Trustees
held more broadly that the 1853 Act did not interfere with the courts' inherent powers, whether
used to shift fees in a common fund case or in some new setting to which either a common fund or
bad faith theory applied. Id. at 278-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. See John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1597, 1601 (1974).
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tiff only when the plaintiff brings a claim in bad faith. A bad faith "ex-
ception" to a general rule of pro-plaintiff fee shifting would be
consistent with the courts' inherent powers to discourage fraudulent lit-
igation.96 Although the litigation model simulated in this Article does
not take fraudulent litigation into account, it is evident that the model
provides support for the bad faith exception.- Bad faith litigation is sim-
ply a type of tort.9 The costs imposed by bad faith litigation are the
costs borne by the defendant. Shifting the litigation costs to the plain-
tiff is equivalent to requiring the plaintiff to pay compensatory dam-
ages. The Court adopted this general standard in Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC,95 which declared the Proplaintiff rule with a bad
faith exception to be the standard governing two-way fee shifting re-
quired by statutes that award fees to the prevailing party, such as Sec-
tion 1988.11
What should a plaintiff do in order to be deemed "prevailing"
under a statute awarding fees to the prevailing party? Should a plaintiff
who wins only a nominal award be allowed to shift his attorney's fees to
the defendant? The results of the model simulations support a liberal
interpretation of the term "prevailing." Pro-plaintiff fee shifting pro-
vides an important benefit: it enhances compliance. This enhancement
is the result of incentives provided to victims whose losses range from
trivial to large. A rule denying fees to plaintiffs whose damages fail to
meet a certain threshold level reduces compliance incentives by barring
suits by plaintiffs below the threshold. Such a bar would probably have
a substantial effect on compliance incentives for two reasons. First,
small injury plaintiffs are likely to be the largest class of plaintiffs.100
96. See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61
N.C. L. Rev. 613 (1982); Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing
the Problem, 1986 Duke L. J. 435, 441-44.
97. See W. Page Keeton, et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 119-21 at 870-
900 (West, 5th ed. 1984). See also Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422
(8th Cir. 1986).
98. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
99. Id. at 423. As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) provides in pertinent part: "In any
action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of
this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Other two-way fee shift-
ing statutes have received the same interpretation. See, for example, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (1988);
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), 2072(a), 2073 (1988); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988).
100. Most studies of tort litigation find that injury claims are more frequent in smaller
amounts. The frequency distribution of injuries typically resembles the exponential probability
density. For an example, see Alfred F. Conard, et al., Automobile Accident Costs and Payments:
Studies in the Economics of Injury and Reparation 137-52 (U. of Mich., 1964). The distributions
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Second, the Proplaintiff rule encourages small injury plaintiffs to bring
suit when the probability of victory is high. 01 Thus, a rule that effec-
tively bars small injury plaintiffs eliminates the largest class of plain-
tiffs whose claims are the strongest.
One might argue that a restrictive prevailing plaintiff standard
would help to screen out fraudulent litigation. While it is desirable to
discourage fraudulent efforts to shift fees, this goal requires a case-by-
case examination, as discussed below. Setting an award threshold below
which successful plaintiffs will not be deemed "prevailing" will do noth-
ing to discourage fraudulent or opportunistic fee requests generally.
The plaintiff who receives an award above the threshold would be unaf-
fected by a restrictive rule.
The Supreme Court has taken a liberal interpretive approach to
the term "prevailing plaintiff." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
Independent School District o2 defined a prevailing plaintiff as one who
has "succeed[ed] on any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d]
some of the benefit the [plaintiff] sought in bringing the suit."'' 03 The
Court further noted that "at a minimum... the plaintiff must be able
to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relation-
ship between itself and the defendant."' 0'°
Consistent with the interpretation in Texas State Teachers, the
Court recently held in Farrar v. Hobby 0 5 that a plaintiff who wins only
nominal damages may be eligible for a fee award under Section 1988.10 6
Farrar also held, however, that the plaintiff's degree of success is the
shown in Conard's book are "left censored" because they reflect cases in which the expected award
exceeded the cost of claiming (that is, the smallest claims are not captured by the sample). The
evident left censoring, however, should not disturb the picture of the underlying distribution.
101. Under the Proplaintiff rule, the plaintiff has an incentive to bring suit whenever PpJ >
(1 - Pp)Cp. Assume the plaintiff is confident that he will win. In this case even a plaintiff who has
suffered a very minor injury will have an incentive to bring suit.
102. 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
103. Id. at 789 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
104. Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792.
105. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
106. Id. at 573. The most recent appeals court decision to adopt this interpretation is Dome-
gan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1992). Before the decision in Farrar, two earlier Supreme
Court opinions had guided courts on this question: Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987), and
Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988). In Hewitt, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to a fee award under § 1988 because he had obtained no relief on any claim in litigation;
"[tihe most that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been
dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim." Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760. In Rhodes, the Su-
preme Court reversed a § 1988 fee award, observing that the "case was moot before judgment
issued, and the judgment therefore afforded the plaintiffs no relief whatsoever" since one inmate
died and the other was released from custody prior to judgment. Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 4. The plain-
tiff victories in Rhodes and Hewitt are examples of purely technical or de minimis victories that
would not lead to a fee award under the Texas State Teachers standard. In the courts of appeals
that have considered the nominal awards problem, the basic issue has been whether a nominal
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most important factor in determining the reasonableness of an award. 107
Therefore, the plaintiff in Farrar, who sought seventeen million dollars
but won only nominal damages, was not entitled to a fee award.108 How
lower courts will interpret the muddled ruling of Farrar is unclear. If
courts read the second part of the holding as limited to the particular
facts of Farrar, then it would remain within courts' discretion in the
vast majority of cases to award fees to plaintiffs whose injuries are
small. This outcome is preferable if compliance incentives are to be
maintained.
B. What Fees Should Be Shifted?
The results of the model simulations provide support for a liberal
interpretation of the word "fee" in statutes that provide for pro-plain-
tiff fee shifting. Viewed in terms of this guideline, the Court's record
has been spotty.
In its most recent decision, West Virginia University Hospitals v.
Casey,109 the Court took a wooden approach, holding that fees for ser-
vices rendered by experts in civil rights litigation may not be shifted to
the losing party as part of a reasonable attorney's fee under Section
1988.110 The Court offered no policy argument in support of the deci-
sion; its sole justification was that a literal reading of Section 1988
failed to reveal an intention on the part of Congress to shift experts'
fees to the losing party.1 '
Statutes that permit shifting reasonable attorneys' fees in favor of
prevailing plaintiffs should be understood to require the application of
something similar to a bad faith standard. The statutes should apply an
expansive standard that would avoid providing incentives for plaintiffs
to inflate fees, prolong litigation, or pursue frivolous claims. Expenses
for which the fee shifting statute or the definition of costs in 28 U.S.C.
Section 1920112 do not explicitly provide should nevertheless be shifted
as long as they are expenses that an attorney would ordinarily incur in
award should be considered equivalent to the interlocutory ruling in Hewitt, or the moot-before-
judgment finding in Rhodes.
107. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 574-75.
108. Id. at 575.
109. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
110. Id. at 1148. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, now
allows winning plaintiffs to collect expert witness fees. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 113, 105 Stat. at
1079.
111. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1147.
112. Section 1920 provides in pertinent part:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: (1) Fees of
the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing
and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use
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a reasonably efficient effort to prosecute the plaintiff's case. Thus,
travel expenses and telephone bills, which civil rights courts routinely
tax against losing defendants although neither Section 1988 nor Section
1920 explicitly provide for them, would fall within the definition of a
reasonable attorney's fee.113 Paralegal"' and expert witness fees would
also be included in the fee. A liberal bad faith standard would give dis-
cretion to the court in awarding fees, but the general aim of such a
standard would be to deny plaintiffs' attempts to shift costs that are
beyond those an average attorney" 5 would be expected to incur in the
case. A liberal bad faith standard also would remove the incentive in-
herent in a pro-plaintiff fee shifting rule for plaintiffs to lengthen the
proceedings. In light of this standard one can expand upon and par-
tially justify the decision in City of Riverside v. Rivera."'
In Rivera the Court held that federal courts must consider the pro-
portion of legal costs to damages in considering the reasonableness of
an attorney's fee."' The model of litigation presented in this Article
makes no attempt to take into account the problem of opportunism and
for this reason suggests that no requirement should be imposed that the
relationship between costs and damages be examined. If costs are nec-
essary or reasonable, then any effort to limit them by referring to the
amount of the damage payment will only discourage victims with claims
that are costly to prove from bringing suit, or, alternatively, encourage
defendants to adopt uncompromising litigation strategies."' Of course,
in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court ap-
pointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988).
113. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1151.
114. The Court in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284-89 (1989), held that the term "rea-
sonable attorney's fee" in § 1988 includes the fees of paralegals.
115. An average attorney is one whose skills meet the average of the appropriately defined
community of attorneys.
116. 473 U.S. 1315 (1985).
117. Id. at 1321. The amount of the award is one of the twelve factors enumerated in John-
son v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve factors that mea-
sure the reasonableness of an attorney's fee are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary
fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation,
and ability of the attorney, (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 717-19 (emphasis
added).
118. See Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing the Stalingrad de-
fense, which amounts to forcing the plaintiff to win every victory from rock to rock and tree to
tree). In a regime in which fee awards are limited to an amount less than or equal to the amount
the plaintiff collects in damages, defendants' potential losses from overly aggressive litigation are
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this conclusion follows only because the model has assumed that the
problem of bad faith litigation does not exist.
Because lawyers who represent plaintiffs suing under a pro-plaintiff
fee shifting rule will have incentives to inflate fees,119 some effort must
be made to deter this behavior. In determining the reasonableness of a
fee request, the proper comparison is between the expected level of
damages and the requested fee. Jury verdicts can result in overcompen-
sation or undercompensation. Determining the reasonableness of the
fee request by comparing the request'to the amount of damages pun-
ishes the plaintiff who receives less than his estimate of the expected
value of the judgment calculated at the time the legal expenses were
incurred.
Using the terms introduced earlier in this Article, particularly in
Part III, instead of comparing J and Cp as the Rivera Court sug-
gested,12 0 the reasonableness of the fee request should be based on a
comparison of Cp and PpE(J), where E(J) is the expected damage judg-
ment. The comparison is further complicated by the fact that the plain-
tiff is operating under a pro-plaintiff fee shifting rule; the plaintiff
generally will spend more on litigation because he expects to have his
fees shifted if he wins. A proper test for opportunism would therefore
hold a fee request unreasonable if and only if
Cp > PpE(J)/(1 - Pp).
To see the difference between the test proposed in this Article and
the hindsight test urged by Justice Rehnquist in Rivera, consider the
case in which the court will set J equal to 100 with probability 1/5 and
J equal to 200 with probability 4/5. Further assume that the plaintiff's
reduced by the existence of a ceiling on the plaintiff's award. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Su-
preme Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986 Terms: Economics, Ethics, and Ex Ante
Analysis, 1 Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 621, 624-26 (1988).
119. For a recent discussion of the problem, see Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorney's Fees in
Common Fund Actions, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 848-52 (1991).
120. Rehnquist does not state a mathematical rule in the Rivera opinion. His discussion
clearly suggests, however, that courts should compare the judgment with the requested fee. The
most illuminating part of the opinion appears in the next to last paragraph:
The billing experience I gained in 16 years of private practice strongly suggests to me that a
very reasonable client might seriously question an attorney's bill of $245,000 for services
which had resulted solely in a monetary award of less than $34,000. In this sense nearly all
fees are to a certain extent "contingent," because the time billed for a lawsuit must bear a
reasonable relationship not only to the difficulty of the issues involved but to the amount to
be gained or lost by the client in the event of success or failure. Nothing in the language of
§ 1988 or in the legislative history set forth above satisfies me that Congress intended to
dispense with this element of billing judgment when a court fixes attorney's fees pursuant to
the statute.
Rivera, 473 U.S. at 1321. The text argues that this statement reveals a misunderstanding of the
economics of fee shifting.
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estimate of the likelihood of a verdict in his favor is 4/5 throughout the
trial. Then the expected judgment is equal to
PpE(J) = (4/5)[(1/5)(100) + (4/5)(200)] = $144.
Multiplying the expected judgment by five yields $720. Suppose the re-
quested bill is $500. Evaluated ex ante, the attorney's expenses would
have been reasonable since the expected cost is less than the expected
judgment. Evaluated in terms of the ex post test suggested by Rehn-
quist, the attorney's bill would be considered quite unreasonable. Gen-
erally, whenever the plaintiff has a high probability of winning (that is,
a strong claim) coupled with a low probability of a very small award, it
is likely that bills will appear opportunistic ex post, although they were
reasonable ex ante.
One problem with the approach urged here is that the expected
level of damages from the victim's perspective changes over time.121 An
accurate. approach to the determination of reasonableness would try to
take into account upward revisions in the plaintiff's expected recovery
since such revisions would lead the plaintiff to invest more in litigation
as the trial proceeds. So many factors should be taken into account in
determining reasonableness, however, that a simple test should be ap-
plied initially.
A simple approach to the determination of reasonableness would
take the final judgment as the expected judgment and simply multiply
by the odds ratio PP/(1 - P ) If the plaintiff's probability of winning is
one-half, then this approacZ is equivalent to Rehnquist's ex post test. If
the plaintiff's estimate of the likelihood of winning should have been
less than one-half, then the requested fee would appear opportunistic if
it exceeds the final judgment. If the plaintiff's estimate of the
probability of winning should have been greater than one-half, then a
fee request larger than the final judgment would not immediately sug-
gest opportunism. Even this simplified test is not easy to apply. How,
for example, would a court discover evidence on the plaintiff's estimate
of the probability of victory? No alternative exists, however, to the test
proposed here. The ex post test suggested by Rehnquist arbitrarily pun-
ishes victims with strong claims.22
121. Most economic models of litigation, such as the one examined in this Article, simplify
matters by treating litigation as a one-stage procedure. A more realistic approach, however, would
treat litigation as a series of motions, each with its own cost and probability of success. William
Baxter made this point, among others, in an original and perceptive discussion of the economics of
antitrust litigation. See Robert D. Tollison, ed., The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal
Paper by William Baxter 3 (Lexington Books, 1979).
122. Consider, in light of the test suggested in the text, fee and award levels of $240,000 and
$30,000, which are similar to the numbers in Rivera. Using the test suggested here, one should
solve for the value of Pp such that Pp/(1 - Pp)[30,000] = 240,000. The solution is Pp = 8/9. An
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This Part further explores the Court's treatment of fee enhance-
ment. The Court has proposed three types of enhancement: enhance-
ment to compensate for the risk of loss, for exceptional success, and for
the superior quality of counsel. In Blum v. Stenson,2 8 the Court au-
thorized federal courts to enhance fee awards in cases of exceptional
success.12 4 In City of Burlington v. Dague, 5 the Court denied federal
courts the authority to enhance fees (the lodestar) to compensate for
the risk of loss.1 26 In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Coun-
cil for Clean Air,27 the Court held that the lodestar cannot be en-
hanced to reflect the superior quality of counsel. 1 2  The following
remarks focus on the first two types of enhancement-for risk of loss
and for exceptional success.
As a preliminary matter one should note that it is difficult to recon-
cile the decisions in Blum and City of Burlington. What defines excep-
tional success if not a case in which the plaintiff wins when the risk of
loss was high? The Court has not explained the difference between
these cases and made no effort to overrule Blum in its City of Burling-
ton opinion.129 Despite this discrepancy, this Article assumes that Blum
has been overruled by City of Burlington. The reason the City of Bur-
lington Court gave for denying federal judges authority to enhance fees
applies with equal force to Blum. If City of Burlington did not overrule
Blum, then every attorney who wishes to have her fees enhanced in a
case in which the risk of loss was high could simply argue that her vic-
tory is a case of "exceptional success."130 Exceptional success and high
risk of loss are indistinguishable categories, and are treated as one be-
appropriate "quick" test of the reasonableness of the fee request in Rivera then would require one
to determine whether 8/9 seemed to be a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's probability of pre-
vailing when the legal expenses were incurred. Although the information necessary to make a rea-
sonableness assessment is not available, 8/9 is a rather high ex ante probability of victory and
seems to be outside of the range of ordinary success probabilities. George Priest and Benjamin
Klein have shown that in many areas of litigation, / seems to be an accurate estimate of the ex
ante probability of success for the plaintiff. See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selec-
tion of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984). Areas of litigation exist, however, in
which one observes success probability estimates greater than 1/2. For a theory that reconciles
these observations with the theory of Priest and Klein, see Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Informa-
tion and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. Legal Stud. 187 (1993).
123. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
124. Id. at 899.
125. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
126. Id. at 2643-44.
127. 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
128. Id. at 567.
129. The City of Burlington Court appeared not to recognize any contradiction between the
holdings. In contrast, the majority opinion referred to Blum in support of its decision. See City of
Burlington, 112 S.Ct. at 2641.
130. Blum, 465 U.S. at 899.
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low. The following discussion focuses on the argument for enhancement
to compensate for risk of loss.
On economic grounds, it is hard to see why courts should enhance
the fee award for risk of loss. A rational, profit-maximizing attorney will
prosecute a plaintiff's claim if and only if the expected payment from
the client exceeds the cost of prosecuting the claim. The plaintiff will
prefer to bring suit only if the expected award exceeds his payment to
the attorney. Given these conditions, enhancement should never be nec-
essary because claims that are not profitable ex ante will not be
brought.
Justice Scalia has argued that if a claim is risky, that fact will be
reflected in the fees because the number of hours required to prepare
the case will be greater and the market rate for the claim will be
higher.""1 The first proposition is wrong as a general matter. As the
probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff falls, an attorney will
generally have less incentive to invest time in litigation, irrespective of
the fee shifting rule in effect.13 2 Scalia's argument appears to be based
on some notion that a minimum number of hours is required to re-
search or prepare a given type of claim; he further assumes that as one
moves into riskier claims, the minimum increases. These assumptions
may be valid, although no empirical evidence exists to support them.
Even if valid, however, the effect identified by Scalia is offset by the
profit-maximization incentive, which generally will lead an attorney to
reduce his time investment as the probability of a plaintiff victory de-
creases. Thus, even if Scalia's underlying premise is accepted, only one
safe conclusion exists: it is unclear how the riskiness of a claim affects a
plaintiff's time investment. The second of Scalia's propositions-that
market rates generally will be higher for riskier claims-is probably
true within one class of claims: antitrust claims. The demand for litiga-
tion, however, varies across classes of claims. For a class in which the
demand is low, either because few victims exist or because the victims
131. He asserted:
We note at the outset that an enhancement for contingency would likely duplicate in substan-
tial part factors already subsumed in the lodestar. The risk of loss in a particular case (and,
therefore, the attorney's contingent risk) is the product of two factors: (1) the legal and fac-
tual merits of the claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing those merits. The second factor,
however, is ordinarily reflected in the lodestar-either in the higher number of hours ex-
pended to overcome the difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and
experienced enough to do so.
City of Burlington, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.
132. Compare Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen, and John Panzar, An Economic Analysis of
Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 L. & Contemp. Probs. 173, 183-84 (1984) (proving that the
incentive to invest increases with the stakes).
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are generally poor, market rates may be much lower than for compara-
bly risky claims drawn from a pool of corporate clients.
Although Justice Scalia's economic analysis in City of Burlington is
unsound, the conclusion that enhancement for risk should be unneces-
sary seems defensible for reasons other than those offered by Scalia.
Because rational attorneys will prosecute only those claims for which
the expected judgment exceeds the expected cost of litigation, the argu-
ment that enhancement is necessary to attract competent attorneys
fails.133 This argument is as defensible as the claim that a price-fixing
conspiracy among ice cream parlor operators within a city is necessary
to attract competent people into the business of selling ice cream. Both
claims assert that it is necessary for the party on the other side of the
transaction-the defendant in the litigation example, the consumer in
the ice cream case-to pay a larger amount in order to subsidize the
activity. This argument begs the question whether risky claims should
be subsidized at all.
Subsidizing risky claims by enhancing fee awards in cases in which
the probability of a plaintiff victory is low will have several effects on
litigation in the field in which the subsidy operates. First, subsidization
will attract attorneys into the subsidized field by increasing the returns
from litigation. For attorneys already in the subsidized field, subsidiza-
tion will increase the amount of effort invested into risky (that is, low-
probability-of-victory) claims. In addition, subsidization will lead to an
increase in the number of risky claims brought within the subsidized
field of litigation. No reason has yet been given why courts should en-
courage low-probability-of-victory claims.
Low-probability-of-victory claims are likely to be of two types:
claims that test a new legal proposition that the court is unlikely to
accept and claims that are weak because the plaintiff may not have
been injured.1 34 There appears to be no reason for encouraging claims
with weak factual bases. Subsidization of such claims tends to en-
courage the type of frivolous suits that courts traditionally have tried to
133. For an alternative analysis, see Warren F. Schwartz and Clinton F. Beckner HI, City of
Burlington v. Dague: The Supreme Court Searches for the Optimal Attorney's Fee in a World of
Legal Uncertainty (1993) (unpublished draft, Georgetown University Law Center, on file with Pro-
fessor Keith N. Hylton). See also Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the Law of
Attorneys' Fees, 12 Rev. Litig. 301 (1993).
134. For example, low-probability-of-victory claims include claims in which the plaintiff is
unlikely to prove injury. The classic example of such a case is an antitrust or a securities plaintiff
who claims that he was injured by the defendant's behavior because the market price of an item
was so high that he was discouraged from purchasing the item. The antitrust and securities laws
generally have denied standing to such plaintiffs based on their inability to prove damages. See,
for example, Kreager v. General Elec. Co., 497 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing standing in
antitrust cases); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (discussing stand-
ing in securities cases).
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discourage through the use of inherent sanctioning powers. Further, no
apparent benefits result from encouraging plaintiffs to test legal pro-
positions that courts are likely to reject. If subsidized plaintiffs are suc-
cessful, they will be encouraged to attempt to have the law rewritten to
meet their preferences. There is simply no guarantee that this type of
litigation would result in desirable changes in the law. Plaintiffs likely
would be encouraged to seek changes that benefit themselves at the ex-
pense of society. Although this type of opportunistic litigation is not
included within the traditional definition of frivolous litigation, the lib-
eral bad faith standard still would seek to remove its incentives. If
plaintiffs' attempts to change the law were unsuccessful, the subsidiza-
tion efforts would have been wasted. Neither outcome offers a clear so-
cial gain.
The argument concerning fee enhancement extends to the Court's
decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart,. 5 which held that hours of work
spent on unsuccessful claims that are distinct from successful claims
must be excluded from a fee award.136 If the hours spent on separable
unsuccessful claims could be billed along with hours spent on successful
claims, plaintiffs would have an incentive to increase the number of
claims they bring without regard to their likelihood of success. 1 7 Be-
cause plaintiffs already have an incentive to bring strong claims for-
ward, including in fees hours spent on unsuccessful claims would only
encourage plaintiffs to pursue weaker claims. It seems undesirable to
substitute weaker claims in place of claims more likely to succeed."'8
135. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
136. Id. at 440.
137. Of course the possibility of Rule 11 sanctions deters some of this behavior. A substantial
gray area exists, however, between claims that invite sanctions and claims that are merely unlikely
to prevail. See, for example, Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(stating that creative litigation is encouraged and that aggressive litigation should not be penal-
ized). The claims within this gray area would be encouraged by including hours spent on unsuc-
cessful claims in the lodestar.
138. This discussion has ignored legislative intent. One might argue that the legislature in-
tended to promote bringing weaker civil rights claims when it enacted § 1988. That argument is
not pursued here. One should note, however, that nothing in the legislative history supports it:
[T]here is no evidence, however, that Congress, in considering § 1988, had any thought that
civil rights claims were to be on any different footing from other civil claims insofar as settle-
ment is concerned. Indeed, Congress made clear its concern that civil rights plaintiffs not be
penalized for helping to lessen docket congestion by settling their case% out of court.
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 733 (1986) (quoting Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985)).
For a discussion of doubts about the desirability of encouraging substitution toward weaker
claims, see John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L. J. 473,
482-97 (1981). Leubsdorf argues in favor of enhancing awards by the same percentage in areas that
are considered relatively risky or unremunerative. Id. at 501-12. His argument appears entirely
consistent with the analysis presented in this Article. The text, however, considers only whether it
is desirable within a class of claims to subsidize the riskier ones.
FEE SHIFTING
C. The Conflict Between Settlement and Compliance Incentives
Two recent Supreme Court cases have addressed the possible con-
flict between fee shifting rules that promote settlement incentives and
rules that enhance incentives to comply with the law. In Evans v. Jeff
D.,189 the Court held that federal courts have the discretion to approve
settlements conditioned upon waiver of fee awards under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.140 In Marek v. Chesny,14 1
the Court held that the term "costs" in Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure142 includes attorneys' fees when the plaintiff's claim is
based on a statute that both authorizes courts to tax costs against the
losing party and includes attorneys' fees within the set of the costs that
may be taxed. 4" Thus, a prevailing civil rights plaintiff who receives
less from the judgment than he would have received from the defend-
ant's final settlement offer is precluded under Rule 68 from shifting his
attorney's fees to the defendant, although Section 1988 permits such
shifting.
In each of these opinions the Court argued that its holding was
required by the terms of the relevant statute. In Evans the Court ex-
plained that nothing in the text or the history of the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 suggested that Congress intended to
deny courts the authority to approve settlements conditioned upon
waiver of fee awards.14 4 Similarly, the Court justified Marek as a
straightforward interpretation of Rule 68.1" Both opinions, however, of-
fered the additional justification that the decision encouraged settle-
ment.140 To deny federal courts the discretion to approve settlements
conditioned upon waiver of fee awards would restrict the set of feasible
settlement packages, and thereby reduce the rate of settlement.147 In
Marek, the Court's policy argument was grounded on the generally ac-
cepted intention of Rule 68: to encourage settlement. 4 Dissents by
Justice Brennan in both cases noted that the Court was placing the pol-
139. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
140. Id. at 737-38. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1988).
141. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
142. F.R.C.P. 68 provides that if a timely pretrial offer of settlement is not accepted and "the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay
the costs incurred after the making of the offer."
143. Marek, 473 U.S. at 9.
144. Evans, 475 U.S. at 742-43.
145. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5-7.
146. Id. at 11; Evans, 475 U.S. at 733-37.
147. Evans, 475 U.S. at 732; Marek, 473 U.S. at 6-7.
148. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11.
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icy of encouraging settlement above that of encouraging compliance
with the civil rights laws.149
The results presented in this Article suggest that no conflict may
exist between cost allocation rules that encourage settlement and rules
that encourage compliance. If the model simulations are valid predic-
tions of the compliance and settlement results under the various fee
shifting rules, then the Proplaintiff rule established by the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 should encourage compliance and
settlement. The rule should encourage compliance because it gives civil
rights victims a strong incentive to sue. It should encourage settlement
because the probability that the defendant is guilty, given that the
plaintiff has brought suit, is smallest under the Proplaintiff rule. As a
result, the settlement gap is narrower under pro-plaintiff fee shifting
than under the other fee rules. The Court did not consider the possibil-
ity that no tension exists between fee rules promoting compliance and
fee rules promoting settlement in either the majority or the dissenting
opinions of Marek and Evans.
If no conflict exists between fee rules that promote compliance and
rules that promote settlement, then the reasoning of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Marek and Evans falls apart. The no-conflict re-
sult inflicts greater damage, however, on the majority opinions of both
cases. The majority opinions sought to limit the scope of pro-plaintiff
fee shifting in order not to discourage settlement. The Court based its
views entirely on speculation, however, for it had no empirical evidence
that the enforcement of a pro-plaintiff fee shifting rule discouraged
settlement.
'It is possible that the model simulations' results are not valid pre-
dictions because the model has taken a simplistic approach to incen-
tives under fee shifting. Kathryn Spier recently demonstrated that a
Rule 68-like fee shifting rule has the desirable property of encouraging
parties to reveal private information, which increases the probability of
settlement.150 Perhaps a more general model in which parties choose
149. Evans, 475 U.S. at 743 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marek, 473 U.S. at 15 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court noted the tension between settlement and litigation incentives and took an
approach consistent with Brennan's view in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350
(1981), which held that Rule 68 is inapplicable when the defendant obtains the judgment.
150. See Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and Fee-Shifting Mechanisms: A Theoreti-
cal Foundation for Rule 68 (June 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author, Dep't of
Economics, Harvard U.). Note that the text uses the term "Rule 68-like." Spier's model assumes a
two-way fee shifting rule similar in operation to Rule 68. Of course, Rule 68 shifts in only one
direction (from the plaintiff to the defendant) and does not shift fees.
In an earlier theoretical examination of Rule 68, George Priest found that the rule encourages
settlement under certain conditions and encourages litigation under other conditions. See George
L. Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis, 1 S. Ct. Econ.
Rev. 163 (1982). He concluded that the Rule's more likely effect is to encourage litigation. Id. at
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whether to comply and to reveal private information in the course of
litigation might support the more intuitive conclusion that fee rules
that promote compliance do so at the expense of discouraging
settlement.
Thus, a more general model of litigation might provide a justifica-
tion for the Supreme Court's decision in Marek. This conclusion is
problematic in that it rests on the assumption that courts do not err in
determining liability. In a regime in which courts make mistakes, a Rule
68-like fee shifting rule may not enhance truth-telling in settlement ne-
gotiations. If, for example, courts generated random "yes" or "no" ver-
dicts on the question of liability, the parties' incentives in settlement
negotiations would be affected, but probably not in a manner that en-
couraged truth-telling. More generally, if courts fail to determine accu-
rately guilt or innocence or the level of damages, little reason exists to
believe that parties will reveal the truth during settlement negotiations,
whatever the applicable fee shifting rule. Parties' actions during settle-
ment negotiations will be based on forecasts of what the court is likely
to do. If predictable errors or biases are evident in the court's decision-
making process, the parties will take them into account at the settle-
ment stage, and settlement demands will reflect the errors, regardless of
their relationship to the truth.
Assume that the Court's intuition is correct-that the incentive ef-
fects of fee rules that promote compliance conflict with those that pro-
mote settlement. The question that follows is whether the incentive to
comply is a more important concern than the incentive to settle. That
question cannot be answered without some well-defined notion of social
welfare. It is not enough to adopt a goal such as minimizing the costs of
injury, the costs of avoiding injury, plus the administrative costs of the
court system. Even this simple test requires that some estimates be
made of the components of the welfare function before it can be used to
analyze the tradeoff between compliance and settlement incentives.
A final resolution of these issues will require empirical examination
of the effects of fee shifting on compliance and settlement rates. In light
of this fact, perhaps the most troubling aspect of the majority opinions
in Marek and Evans is that the Court staked its policy argument on
empirical assumptions that are as yet unsupported by evidence. On the
other hand, waiting for empirical evidence in this area is problematic; it
may never come. No natural experiments would allow comparison of
the incentive effects of alternative fee shifting rules.
164-65. Geoffrey Miller found that Rule 68 encourages settlement slightly but that its more signifi-
cant effect is to transfer wealth from plaintiffs to defendants. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic
Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. Legal Stud. 93 (1986).
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D. Some Implications for the History of Fee Shifting Doctrine, and
Speculative Remarks
The suggestion that the rule the Court adopted in Christiansburg
Garment should apply generally to all litigation may appear foolhardy
because it seems to be outside the range of experience. One might argue
that general patterns of fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs are
not apparent, because earlier generations likely discovered that such fee
shifting was unwise. The current practice reflects traditions that have
survived because they were superior to alternative practices; at the
least, a system that has worked for so long should be changed only with
great care.
This appeal to doctrinal stability is misplaced, at least where fee
shifting is concerned. While there appears to be no country in which fee
shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs is now the norm, it was the orig-
inal practice in English courts. Blackstone asserted that fees generally
were included in damages, although no explicit statutory or common-
law rule authorized the practice. 151 At the same time, fines were used to
penalize frivolous litigants.
52
What led to the American and British rules that predominate to-
day? It seems that the common-law practice fell victim to interest
group legislation everywhere. The British rule is the result of a series of
statutes, beginning with the codification of the practice of awarding fees
to prevailing plaintiffs in the Statute of Gloucester of 1275.1 s The codi-
fication effort appears to have given rise to efforts to shift fees in favor
of prevailing defendants,154 leading finally to a statute that awarded
costs to prevailing defendants in all actions in which a plaintiff might
recover costs. 5  The American rule, on the other hand, seems to have
been the unintended byproduct of mercantilist interests. The capping
of lawyers' fees in Colonial era statutes appears to have been part of a
general pattern of legislating ceilings on the wages that various labor
151. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at *399 (cited in note 8).
152. Id. at *398-99.
153. 6 Edw. 1, ch.1. See John Hullock, Law of Costs 4 (1793). For a good, fairly recent discus-
sion of the development of the British system, see William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202, 204-07 (1966).
One should note that the Statute of Marlborough of 1267 preceded that of Gloucester and
awarded costs to the defendant in one particular form of action. See Stoebuck, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev.
at 204. Because the statute awarded costs to the defendant -only when the suit was "malicious," see
Hullock, Law of Costs at 124, it should not be considered in the same class of general fee shifting
statutes discussed here.
-154. Stoebuck, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 204 (cited in note 153).
155. 4 Jac. 1, ch.3. See Hullock, Law of Costs at 125 (cited in note 153).
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groups could demand. 156 The fee ceilings could be evaded easily by a
lawyer and his client; this practice of evasion gave rise to the American
rule. 5 ' It was much easier for lawyers to challenge the statutory ceilings
on charges to their own clients than the ceilings on charges to the op-
posing party. 1 5
The recommendation of a general rule shifting fees in favor of pre-
vailing plaintiffs seeks nothing more than a return to the common-law
practice. The argument that it is wise to stick with time-honored prac-
tices weighs in favor of this recommendation.
V. CONCLUSION
Rules of civil procedure typically are treated as if they have no ef-
fect on incentives to comply with the law. On the other hand, fee shift-
ing provisions of federal statutes, such as the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, often are justified by reference to predicted
effects on ex ante incentives. The consequence is that the theoretical
analysis of procedural rules is incomplete and somewhat confusing. An
adequate theory of procedural rules should take into account their in-
fluence on ex ante incentives, and the justifications of fee shifting stat-
utes should be based on something more than pure hunch.
This Article has examined the influence of fee shifting on ex ante
incentives within a model of litigation. The Article examined four fee
shifting rules: the American rule, the British rule, fee shifting in favor
of the prevailing plaintiff (the Proplaintiff rule), and fee shifting in
favor of the prevailing defendant (the Prodefendant rule). The influ-
ence of each of these rules was examined under three information re-
gimes: one in which the plaintiff enjoys an informational advantage in
litigation, a second in which the defendant enjoys an informational ad-
vantage in litigation, and a third in which neither party enjoys an infor-
mational advantage. A surprisingly consistent result emerged: fee
shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs enhances both incentives to
comply with legal rules and incentives to settle disputes.
Part IV of this Article examined the implications of the model's
results for Supreme Court decisions interpreting fee shifting statutes.
The results presented in this Article support the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Christiansburg Garment to read a double standard into the pro-
vision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that shifts the fees of the prevailing
156. For the theory that mercantilist interests demanded such ceilings, which were generally
accepted because of the dominance of mercantilist theories, see Richard B. Morris, Government
and Labor in Early America (Octagon Books, 1946)..
157. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recov-
ery, 47 L. & Contemp. Probs. 9, 10-13 (1984).
158. Id. at 13.
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party. The double standard of Christiansburg Garment permits fee
shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs generally, but in favor of pre-
vailing defendants only in cases of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.
The more recent Supreme Court decisions have veered away from this
functional approach toward an almost literal reading of the fee shifting
statutes. The most interesting implication of the Christiansburg Gar-
ment decision concerns the supposed conflict between settlement and
compliance incentives that divided the majority and dissenting opinions
in Marek v. Chesny. This Article suggests that there may be no conflict.
FEE SHIFTING
APPENDIX
I. BASIC FEATURES
All actors in this model are risk neutral. The model assumes that
victims are the only ones who suffer loss from an accident, that the risk
of loss to victims can be reduced by potential injurers exercising pre-
caution, and that it is costly for potential injurers to take care. Let p =
the probability of loss if potential injurers do not take care, where p >
0; let q = the probability of loss if injurers do take care, where p > q
> 0. Let v = the loss that an accident victim suffers, where v > 0. The
variable v is assumed to be random, with distribution function H(v).
Let x = the cost to a potential injurer of taking care, where x > 0.
The variable x is assumed to be random, with distribution function
G(x). The value of x is unobservable to potential victims; the injurer,
however, observes and knows the value when he chooses whether to
take care.
A victim sues for the value of her loss, v. The model assumes that
courts occasionally make mistakes in deciding liability. With this in
mind, let Q1 = the probability of type one error-that is, that the court
erroneously fails to hold a defendant liable-where 0 < Q1 < 1. Let Q
= the probability of type two error-that is, that the court erroneously
holds a defendant liable-where 0 < Q < 1. The model further as-
sumes that victims and injurers know Q1 and Q2.
An injurer will be held liable only when he fails to comply with the
due care standard, which is provided by the Hand formula for negli-
gence. According to the Hand formula, an actor is negligent if he fails to
take care when the cost of taking care is less than the increase in ex-
pected accident losses-that is, when x < (p - q)E(v).
II. COMPARISON OF COMPLIANCE EQUILIBRIA UNDER ALTERNATIVE FEE
SHIFTING RULES
Four information regimes are possible in this model. First, both the
plaintiff and the defendant may be uninformed. In the second and third
regimes, only one of the parties is informed. In the fourth regime, both
parties are informed. The following subparts examine the equilibrium
in each of the first three regimes.
A. Plaintiff Uninformed, Defendant Informed
Let a = the expected cost of litigation to the defendant (which will
depend on the cost allocation rule in effect). Let S1 = the expected
settlement amount when the defendant does not comply with the due
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care standard. Let S., = the expected settlement amount when the de-
fendant does comply with the due care standard.
Using the defined terms, a general description of equilibrium under
negligence is as follows:15
r (p-q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] 1  dG(x),
J p(1-H(v,))S1 - q[[H(v,)-H(v)]S2 +[1-H(v,)][QE(vtv>v 2)-+'-]]
where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a poten-
tial injurer to take care and is given by
g = G[(p-q)v]G[p(1-H(v))S 1 - q([H(v2)-H(v)]S 2+[1-H(v 2)][Q 2E(vlv>v2 ) +])].' 06
B. Plaintiff Informed, Defendant Uninformed
This subpart presents the equilibrium solutions under the four fee
shifting rules. In order to simplify matters, it is assumed that the de-
fendant's settlement offer is equal to his expected liability (litigation
costs plus expected liability). This proposition is equivalent to assuming
that the plaintiff has all of the bargaining power.
In this case, the defendant's estimate of the probability of a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff is Pd = W(1 - Q1) + (1 - W)Q2 . The plaintiff's
estimate of the likelihood of a verdict in his favor is Pp = 1 - Q1 if the
defendant is guilty and Pp - Q2 if the defendant is innocent. As ex-
plained below, rather strong assumptions are necessary to support these
calculations.
1. American Rule
The victim has an incentive to bring suit whenever
Ppv > Cp.
Thus, the probability that a plaintiff will bring suit given that an acci-
dent leads to loss is 1 - H[Cp/(1 - Q,)] when the defendant is guilty and
1 - H(Cp/Q) when the defendant is innocent.
Given the definition of negligence, equilibrium under the American
rule requires:
(p - q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] -1  dG(x),
J B
159. The derivation of the equilibrium solution is presented in a simpler model in Keith N.
Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J. L. Econ. & Org. 433 (1990).
160. For a detailed discussion of the equilibrium solutions under each of the four fee shifting
rules in the information regime in which the plaintiff is uninformed and the defendant is informed,
see Hylton, 22 J. Legal Stud. at 455 (cited in note 5).
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where B is equal to
p[1-H[Cp/(1-Q,)]] [PdE[viv >Cp/(1-Q 1)] + Cd] - q[1-H(Cp/Q.)] [PdE [vfv>Cp/Q,)] +Cd],
and where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a
potential injurer to take care and is given by
g = G[(p-q)E(v)]G(B).
The assumptions implicit in these equations must be noted. These
equations assume first that the defendant, whether he has taken care or
not, perceives his probability of being found guilty as equal to the pop-
ulation probability of guilt. Second, the equations imply that the de-
fendant knows the rate at which suit is brought against defendants who
take care and those who do not, but does not use this information to
modify his estimate of the probability of a verdict in the plaintiff's
favor. A number of explanations can be given for these assumptions.
The simplest seems to be this: the equations assume that the court
treats each case as indistinguishable from another and therefore the
probability of a finding of guilt is equal in every case to the probability
of guilt in the population.
2. British Rule
The victim has an incentive to bring suit whenever
Ppv > (I - Pp)C.
Thus, the probability that a plaintiff will bring suit given that an acci-
dent leads to loss is 1 - H[QC/(1 - Q1)] when the defendant is guilty
and 1 - H((1 - Q.)C/Q.) when the defendant is innocent.
Equilibrium under the British rule requires:
r (p-q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] 1  dG(x),
J B
where B is equal to
p[1-H[QlC/(1-Q)IPd[E[vfv>QLC/(1-Q)]+C] - q[1-H((1-QC/Q.)]Pd[E[vlv>(i-Q,C/
Q1)]+C],
and where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a
potential injurer to take care and is given by
g = G(B).
3. Proplaintiff Rule
The victim has an incentive to bring suit whenever
Pv> (1-Pp)Cp.
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Thus, the probability that a plaintiff will bring suit given that an acci-
dent leads to loss is 1 - H[QICp/(1 - Q1)] when the defendant is guilty
and 1 - H[(1 - Q2)C /Q2] when the defendant is innocent.
Equilibrium under the Proplaintiff rule requires:
(p - q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] -1  dG(x),
fB
where B is equal to
p[1-H[QICp/(1-Q 1)]][PdE[vtv>Q.CP/(1-Ql) + Cp] + Cd-q[l -H((1-QCp/Q,)][PdE
[viv>(1-Q 2 C p/Q2) + Cp] + Cd],
and where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a
potential injurer to take care and is given by
g = G(B).
4. Prodefendant Rule
The victim has an incentive to bring suit whenever
Ppv>Cp + (I-Pp)Cd.
Thus, the probability that a plaintiff will bring suit given that an acci-
dent leads to loss is 1 - H[(Cp + (1 - Pp)Cd)/PpI]
Equilibrium under the Prodefendant rule requires:
[ (p - q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] -1  dG(x),
IB
where B is equal to
p[1-H[(C + QlCd)/(1-Q)]]Pd[E[vv>(C p + Q1Cd/(1-QI) ] + Cd]-q[1-H((C p + (1-
Q2Cd)/Q2)]Pd[E[Vi > (Cp + (1 -QCd)/Q] + CA
and where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a
potential injurer to take care and is given by
g = G(B).
C. Both Parties Uninformed
This subpart assumes that ex ante-that is, before the accident oc-
curs-Pd = P = W(1 - Q1) + (1 - W)Q2 . Ex post, Pp = W(1 - Q1) +(1 - W)Q2 andPd = W(1 - Q) + (1 - W)Q -_E.
1. American Rule
The victim has an incentive to bring suit whenever
Ppv > Cp.
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Thus, the probability that a plaintiff will bring suit given that an acci-
dent leads to loss is 1 - H(Cp/Pp).
Equilibrium under the American rule requires:
(p - q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] "  dG(x),
(p-q)[1-H(Cp/Pp)][PdE(viv>CP/PP) + Cd]
where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a poten-
tial injurer to take care and is given by
g = G[(p-q)[1-H(Cp/Pp)[PdE(vfv >Cp/Pp) + Cd]I.
The probability of litigation is Prob(tv > C).
2. British Rule
Equilibrium under the British rule requires:
f (p - q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p]-1  dG(x),
f (p-q)[1-H((1-Pp)C/Pp)]Pd[E(vv >(1-Pp)C/Pp) + C]
where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a poten-
tial injurer to take care and is given by
g = G[(p-q)[1-H((1-Pp)C/Pp)]Pd[E(vlv>(1-PP)C/PP) + C]].
The probability of litigation is Prob[E(v + C) > C].
3. Proplaintiff Rule
Equilibrium under the Proplaintiff rule requires:
(p - q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] -I  dG(x),I (p-q)[1-H((1-Pp )Cp/P)]Pd[E(vv >(1-P p)Cp/Pp) +C p]+Cd]
where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead a poten-
tial injurer to take care and is given by
g = G[(p-q)[1-H((1-Pp)Cp/Pp)I[Pd[E(vfv >(1-Pp)CpfPp) + Cp] + Cd]].
The probability of litigation is Prob[E(v + Cp) > C].
4. Prodefendant Rule
Equilibrium under the Prodefendant rule requires:
f (p - q)E(v)
W = p[gq+(1-g)p] 1  dG(x),J (p-q) [1-H(Cp+ (1-Pp)Cd/Pp)]Pd[E(vfv> (Cp+ (1-PP)Cd)/Pp) + Cd]
where g is the probability that the threat of liability will lead to a po-
tential injurer to take care and is given by
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g = G[(p-q)[1-H(Cp + (1-PP)Cd/Pp)]Pd[E(viv>(Cp + (1-PP)Cd)/Pp) + Cd]].
The probability of litigation is Prob[e(v + Cd) > C].
